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The long-awaited monetary history of the United States by Friedman 
and Schwartz is in every sense of the term a monumental scholarly 
accomplishment . . . . the volume sets, . . . ,  a new standard for the 
writing of  monetary history,  one that requires the explanation of 
historical developments in terms of monetary theory and the appli- 
cation of them to the techniques of quantitative economic analysis. 
. . . One can safely predict that it will be the classic reference on its 
subject for many years to come. 
H. G. Johnson (1965, 388) 
The book is clearly destined to become a classic, perhaps one of the 
few emerging in that role rather than growing into it. 
A. Meltzer (1965, 404) 
The transcendent virtue of the History is its unerring vision in seeking 
out important problems  and its clear delineation of areas needing 
further research. The book offers an almost inexhaustible supply of 
worthwhile conjectures.  I have no doubt that it, . . . , will be the 
focus of a major share of scholarly research on money and income 
during the coming decade. For this, if for no other reason, the book 
must be counted a monumental contribution to positive economics. 
R. W. Clower (1964, 380) 
This is one of those rare books that leave their mark on all future 
research on the subject. 
J. Tobin (1965, 485) 
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1.1  Introduction 
Four eminent scholars from different schools of thought all believed 
over twenty years ago that A Monetary History of  the United States, 
1867-1960  by Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz, published in 
1963, was destined to become a classic. Their judgment was sound.' 
Table  1.1 presents a chronological breakdown of  references to the 
book in  professional journals.  The citation analysis is based  on two 
sources: the Social Science  Citation Index which covers the  period 
1969 -87,  and a sample of  ten leading journals in monetary economics 
and economic history from 1964 to 1987. The second sample is included 
in the SSCI, but separating it has value because it covers the entire 
period since the book was published and because it allows us to examine 
the incidence of citations in journals from different fields. 
As can be  seen from table  1.1, the number of  citations has been 
increasing, although irregularly, since 1965. This is clearly the hallmark 
of a classic since the citation rate for most articles and books in science 
generally peaks within three years and then gradually tapers off.2 
Also of interest is the pattern of citations revealed by an examination 
of the articles in the sample of ten journals. In the first ten years after 
publication, the majority of articles citing A Monetary History were in 
monetary economics, of which a considerable number concentrated on 
issues raised  by  the debate between  modern quantity theorists  and 
Keynesians. By  contrast, in the last decade, the majority of  articles, 
even those in  mainstream economics journals, have concentrated on 
the interpretation of  historical episodes in A Monetary History. This 
recent interest in monetary history is the focus of this paper. 
A Monetary History is a treatise both in economics and in economic 
history. In the former role, the book uses history to expound the modern 
quantity theory of money. In its latter role, the book reinterprets U.S. 
monetary history in terms of  the relationship between the quantity of 
money and the rest of  the economy. The former treatment represents 
a major component of modern quantity theory research of the 1950s, 
1960s, and 1970s; the latter treatment has in  itself led to a revolution 
in  monetary history  as economic historians  and economists expand 
upon and criticize Friedman and Schwartz's treatment of diverse ep- 
isodes of U.S. monetary history. This paper examines the second legacy 
of A Monetary History-its  role as a progenitor of research in monetary 
history.  Specifically the paper  surveys the literature on three major 
themes in A Monetary History: monetary disturbances (section 1.3), 
the domestic monetary framework and monetary policy (section 1.41, 
and monetary standards (section 1 S). 
As background to the survey in section 1.2, I briefly summarize the 
contribution  of  the  book  to  modern  quantity  theory  research  and Table 1.1  Citations to A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960 in the Literature 




































































































































































































































































































Note: The citations are from: Journal of Political Economy (JPE);  American Economic Review (AER);  Journal of Monetary 
Economics (JME); Journal of  Money, Credit and  Banking (JMCB); Review of  Economics and Statistics (RECSTAT); 
Journal of  Economic History (JEH); Explorations in Economic History (EEH);  Journal of Finance (JF); Economic Journal 
(EJ);  Quarterly Journal of  Economics (QJE); and the Social Science Citation lndex (SSCI). 
"JME began publication in 1975. 
hJMCB began publication in 1969. 18  Michael D. Bordo 
provide a brief overview of its interpretation of U.S. monetary history. 
Finally, the paper concludes with  an evaluation of A  Monetar?, His- 
tory’s contribution to monetary history. 
1.2  Background 
1.2.  I  A Monetary History and the Modern Quantity Theory 
In the 1950s, Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz began their col- 
laboration on the NBER’s highly acclaimed money and business cycles 
project. This collaboration,  over a period of thirty years, resulted in 
A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960  (l963a),  Monetary 
Statistics of  the United States (1970), and Monetary  Trends in the 
United States and the United Kingdom, 1875-1975,  (l982), in addition 
to Phillip Cagan’s Determinants and Effects of  Changes in the Stock 
of  Money,  1875-1960  (1  969, and  several journal articles, including 
“Money and Business Cycles” (1963b). 
The theoretical  background  of  the project  is the modern quantity 
theory of money (Friedman 1956). Based on the interaction of a stable 
demand for money with an independently determined money supply, 
the key proposition of the modern quantity theory is that a change in 
the rate of growth of money will produce a corresponding but lagged 
change in  the rate of growth  of  nominal  income. In  the short run, 
changes in money growth lead to changes in real output. In the long 
run, monetary  change will  be fully  reflected  in  changes in  the price 
level. Long-run historical evidence for the modern quantity theory of 
money is provided in A Monetary History, short-run cyclical evidence 
in “Money and Business Cycles,” and long-run econometric evidence 
in Monetary Trends. 
A  Monetary History  is  a  study of the quantity  of  money  and  its 
influence on economic activity in the U.S. economy over a nearly one- 
hundred-year  span, marked  by drastic changes in monetary arrange- 
ments and in the structure of the economy. The principal finding is that 
changes in the behavior of money are closely associated with the rate 
of change of  nominal income, real income, and the price level. Secu- 
larly, a close relationship between the growth of money and nominal 
income, independent of the growth of real income, is found. Cyclically, 
a close relationship between the rate of change of money and of sub- 
sequent changes in  nominal income is isolated. 
The authors also find a number of remarkably  stable relationships 
between money and other economic variables. These include the find- 
ings that velocity  exhibits a steady secular decline of a little over  I 
percent per annum until after World War 11,  and that the relationship 19  The Contribution of A  Monetury Histor?, 
between U.S. prices  and prices  in  other countries, adjusted for the 
exchange rate, changed little over the period, which is evidence of the 
strength of the purchasing-power-parity theory. 
However, of  most interest are the findings  from history  that the 
money-income  relationship  is  invariant  to changes in  monetary ar- 
rangements and banking structure. These changes are captured in the 
arithmetic of the proximate  determinants of the money supply. Over 
the long run, high-powered money (H)  is the key determinant, supple- 
mented by  the deposit-reserve ratio  (DIR) and the deposit-currency 
ratio (DIC);  over  the cycle the ratios become more important, especially 
in severe contractions, when the DIC ratio dominates. 
The different  monetary arrangements since  1867  include:  (1)  the 
greenback episode, 1861-78,  when the United States had flexible ex- 
change rates with the rest of the world and the money supply became 
an independent variable; (2) the gold standard period, 1879- 1914, when 
the quantity of money became largely a dependent variable determined 
by the country’s trading relationship with the rest of  the world; (3) the 
gold exchange standard, 1919-33,  when the quantity of money, though 
partly determined by external conditions, was also heavily influenced 
by Federal Reserve monetary management; (4) the period since 1934 
described as a  “discretionary fiduciary  standard,”  with gold just a 
commodity the price of which was fixed by an official support program. 
In addition, there were several important changes in  the banking 
structure. These include the establishment of the national banking sys- 
tem (1864) and the Federal Reserve (1914), and the institution of  the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (1934), which removed the threat 
of banking panics. 
Identification of unique historical and institutional circumstances, it 
is argued, provides the closest thing to a controlled experiment in which 
the direction of influence from money to income can be isolated. Thus 
the authors demonstrate that in many cases changes in money were 
independent in origin from and temporally  preceded changes in eco- 
nomic activity-the  most notable examples being the gold discoveries 
in the 1890s, wartime issues of fiat currency, and the restrictive actions 
of the Federal Reserve in 1920-21  and 1937-38.  Although they identify 
an influence from income to money over the business cycle, they argue 
that the main influence, both secularly and cyclically, runs from money 
to income. 
Of  special importance is the evidence on monetary disturbances: 
sharp declines in economic activity were precipitated by sharp reduc- 
tions in the money supply, while episodes of sustained inflation were 
invariably produced by monetary growth in excess of the growth  of 
real output. For both types of disturbance the historical record provides 20  Michael D. Bordo 
instances where inappropriate actions by the monetary authorities were 
to blame. Thus the Great Depression of  1929-33  was a consequence 
of an unprecedented reduction in the quantity of money that the Federal 
Reserve System could have prevented, while episodes of inflation dur- 
ing the Civil War and World Wars I and I1 were the product of wartime 
issues of fiat currency. 
The historical evidence in A Monetary History is complemented by 
evidence on business cycles reported in “Money and Business Cycles” 
and in Cagan’s Determinants. That is, specific cycles in money growth 
precede reference cycle turning points, the amplitude of cycles in money 
growth is closely correlated to business cycles, and the identification 
of major cycles all leads to the conclusion that “appreciable changes 
in the rate of growth of the stock of money are a necessary and sufficient 
condition for appreciable changes in  the rate of  growth of  nominal 
income”  (Friedman and Schwartz  1963b, 53). The evidence argues 
against the view that cycles in monetary growth are merely a lagged 
response to the business cycle. 
Long-run econometric evidence for the modern quantity theory of 
money is based on reference cycle phase-averaged data to remove the 
influence of the business cycle, provided  by Monetary Trends. The 
study examines the relationships among the money stock, nominal and 
real income, the price level, and the interest rate for the United States 
and the United Kingdom for the century from 1875 to 1975. The key 
finding of this work is a stable long-run money demand or velocity 
function for each country, with the money demand function for each 
country affected in similar ways by a common set of determinants. A 
second important finding is parallel movements between money and 
nominal income which, given the stability of money demand and vari- 
ability in conditions of  money  supply, primarily reflect an influence 
running from money to income. 
A third and related finding is the neutrality of money. For the United 
Kingdom and the United States (with one exception) a sustained one- 
percentage-point  change  in  money  leads  cumulatively  to  a  one- 
percentage-point change in the price level. Only for the interwar period 
in the United States does monetary change have a major influence on 
real  income  in  the  same direction,  and a positive relationship exist 
between changes in prices and output-a  relationship consistent with 
a negatively-sloped  Phillips curve.  The idiosyncrasy of the interwar 
period derives, it is argued, from two severe monetary contractions in 
that period. 
Thus A  Monetary History is an integral part of  modern quantity 
theory research. Recent research in macroeconomics on the natural 
rate hypothesis,  the importance of monetary regimes, and the case 
against discretionary monetary policy, builds on its foundation. 21  The Contribution of  A  Monerury History 
I .2.2  Overview of Friedman and Schwartz’s Interpretation of U.S. 
Monetary History,  1867-  1960 
As a backdrop to the literature survey to follow, I will briefly sketch 
some of the salient points of the authors’ reinterpretation of the mon- 
etary history of the United States from shortly after the Civil War to 
after World War 11. 
A  Monetary History  begins in  1867  during the greenback episode 
that ended  1 January 1879. In that period, when the United States had 
a flexible exchange rate with the rest of the gold standard world, the 
principal concern was to resume specie payments at the previous panty. 
Friedman and Schwartz demonstrate, based on earlier work by Kindahl 
(1961), that despite active public debate over the pace and methods to 
achieve the required deflation, resumption was achieved by the econ- 
omy growing up to a constant money stock rather than as a consequence 
of  any explicit government policies. 
The succeeding seventeen years, after the United States successfully 
returned to the gold standard, were characterized by deflation, mon- 
etary instability, and political agitation over the monetary standard. 
The advocates of silver wanted injections of silver to offset the ravages 
of  the worldwide gold deflation.  Instead  of  inflation, Friedman  and 
Schwartz demonstrate, the silver movement produced more deflation 
than would otherwise have been the case, as capital and gold fled the 
United States because of a fear that the U.S. would abandon the gold 
standard. Fear of deflation and silver agitation diminished once new 
gold supplies from South Africa and Alaska swelled the world monetary 
gold stock. The gold discoveries, the authors argue, were no accident 
but were induced, with long lags, by  secular deflation under a com- 
modity standard. 
The national banking system from  1863  to  1914 was characterized 
by  periodic banking panics.  The panics  of  1893  and especially  1907 
precipitated a movement for banking reform which aimed to establish 
an agency to satisfy the public’s demand for high-powered money in 
times of distrust of bank solvency. Friedman and Schwartz argue that 
the Aldrich Vreeland Act of  1908, which was successful in preventing 
a panic in 1914, and the occasional resort by clearinghouses to restric- 
tions of  convertibility of  deposits into currency  under the National 
Banking System, proved superior to the actions of the agency designed 
to prevent panics-the  Federal Reserve System established in  1914. 
The Fed failed to act as a lender of last resort. Had the clearinghouses 
restricted convertibility during the panics of the early  1930s, as they 
would have done in the absence of the Fed, the massive bank failures 
and monetary collapse of  1929-33  would have been averted. 
The newly established Fed, after a serious blunder in  1920-21  when 
it delayed too long to stem the post-World  War  I  commodity price 22  Michael D. Bordo 
boom and then raised the discount rate too sharply, subsequently de- 
veloped the tools to provide monetary  stability in the  1920s. The au- 
thors argue that had the architect of Fed policy in the 1920s, Benjamin 
Strong, lived beyond 1928, the disaster of  1929-33  would have been 
avoided.  A vacuum of leadership  after Strong’s death is held  to be 
responsible for the failure of the Fed to curtail the banking panics and 
its passive acceptance  of a one-third decline in the money supply. Power 
shifted from the New York Federal Reserve Bank, an agency tuned to 
the needs of the money market and adept at the operation of policy, 
to the Federal Reserve Board and the other reserve banks, neither of 
which had the experience or  understanding of monetary policy required 
to deal with the crisis. 
The New Deal introduced legislation which radically altered mone- 
tary arrangements in the United States. Of key importance, according 
to Friedman and Schwartz, was the adoption of federal deposit insur- 
ance in  1934. By eliminating at the outset a loss of confidence by the 
public in convertibility of deposits into currency, it solved the problem 
of banking panics, which the Fed had failed to prevent. 
In addition, prohibition  of private gold holdings, the gold purchase 
program, and revaluation  of the price of gold, converted the United 
States from the gold exchange standard to a managed fiduciary stan- 
dard, with gold relegated to the status of a price-supported commodity. 
Legislation  allowing the Fed  to alter reserve requirements led to a 
disastrous monetary contraction in  1937-38  after the Fed doubled re- 
serve requirements in a mistaken attempt to soak up excess reserves 
to restrict future credit expansion. According to Fnedman and Schwartz, 
the banks held reserves in excess of requirements because their demand 
for liquidity had increased as a result of their traumatic experience of 
the panics of the early  1930s. The increase in required  reserves just 
locked up their precautionary balances, forcing the banks to reduce 
earning assets to restore their reserve holdings to the desired level. 
During the next two decades, monetary policy was subordinated to 
fiscal policy and thus the Fed played a role subservient to the Treasury. 
This passive policy  culminated in the bond-price-support program of 
World War 11.  By pegging the interest rate to short-term treasury bills 
at YE  percent and pledging to maintain the rate on long-term securities 
at 25’2  percent, the Fed was converted into an “engine  of inflation” 
providing whatever high-powered money was required to maintain the 
fixed pattern of interest rates. 
The threat of renewed inflation during the Korean War led to the 
Accord of March 1951  and the restoration of monetary independence 
to the Fed. During the remaining years of the study, according to the 
authors, there was remarkable monetary stability-a  stability which in 
hindsight was quite unique. 23  The Contribution of A  Monetnrv History 
1.3  Monetary Disturbances 
The ninety-four-year span covered by A Monetary History was char- 
acterized by a wide variety of monetary disturbances. Of the twenty- 
four NBER-designated cyclical downturns, six are designated severe, 
each of which Friedman and Schwartz document to have been preceded 
by a sharp downturn in the money supply. Two of  the monetary con- 
tractions, in  1919-21 and 1937-38, were the result of monetary policy 
actions, and the others, including the Great Contraction of  1929-33, 
were marked by banking panics. In addition to monetary disturbances 
that produced declines in economic activity, the book documents one 
period of sustained inflation-from  1897 to 1914, a consequence of the 
gold discoveries-and  two world war periods of fiat-induced inflation.3 
A key theme in A  Monetary History and the subsequent literature 
is the role of monetary institutions and monetary policy in producing 
monetary and economic contraction.  In  consequence, the survey of 
the literature on monetary disturbances focuses on two issues: banking 
panics and the Great Contraction. 
1.3.1  Banking Panics 
Monetary Instability 
Friedman and Schwartz devote considerable attention to the role of 
banking panics in producing monetary and economic instability in the 
United States. 
Bernanke (1983), contrary to Friedman and Schwartz, argues that 
banking panics have direct effects on economic activity over and above 
their effects on the money supply. To the extent that banking panics 
produce losses in the financial sector of  the economy, the cost of  fi- 
nancial intermediation  is increased and the efficiency of resource al- 
location reduced. Bernanke tests this hypothesis on the banking panics 
of  1930-33  by incorporating several measures of the cost of financial 
intermediation-real  deposits and liabilities of  failing banks, and the 
spread between the Baa and the Treasury bond rate-into  a Barro- 
Lucas-type regression equation (which explains changes in output by 
unexpected money growth, unexpected changes in the price level, and 
lagged output). The statistically significant results that he obtains for 
the equation lend support to his hypothesis. 
However, according to Vaubel(1984), Bernanke’s results may imply 
that bank failures led to a risk-induced rise in the demand for money 
or else were associated with an anticipated decline in  output. If  the 
cost  of  financial intermediation  reduced income, it  could only have 
done so because the monetary authorities allowed a large risk premium 
to develop. The risk premium was not the inevitable consequence of 24  Michael D. Bordo 
bank failures, but rather reflected the public’s uncertainty about how 
the authorities would react. 
Brunner and Meltzer (1988) do not accept Bernanke’s treatment of 
the debt crisis as a separate and independent exogenous shock. They 
view the debt crisis as an induced response to the major deflation of 
asset and output price levels consequent upon the failure of the Fed 
to act as a lender of last resort, in a system with  many  holders  of 
nominally fixed debt. Major shocks to the banking system affect the 
money supply and bank credit multipliers simultaneously. 
Bernanke’s interpretation of his results, moreover, suggests that fi- 
nancial intermediation skills would be irretrievably lost as a result of 
bank failures. In fact, however, those skills continued to be available 
once the banking situation stabilized. 
Also contrary to Friedman and  Schwartz on the role  of banking 
panics in producing monetary and real contraction, DeLong and Sum- 
mers (1985) provide evidence that removing panics, and the quarters 
immediately surrounding them, from the data reduces the variance of 
income during 1896-1914  by only 20 percent as against a 40 percent 
reduction in the variance of monetary growth. They therefore conclude 
that monetary shocks are an inadequate explanation of  shocks to real 
output. DeLong and Summers find that severe economic contractions 
before World War I1 were produced by deflationary real shocks which 
raised the real interest rate in the face of sticky nominal rates.4 Such 
an interpretation, however,  is  inconsistent  with  evidence of  a  high 
degree of international capital mobility during this peri~d.~  High real 
interest rates should have attracted capital inflows which would have 
halted severe economic contractions. 
Rational Expectations 
In recent work by Garber (1981), Garber and Flood (1982), and Blan- 
chard and Watson  (1982), bank panics  are viewed  as based on the 
rational expectations hypothesis that rational agents will not system- 
atically make forecast errors. Bank panics are the contagious effects 
of “runs.”  According to Garber (1981): 
A run is defined as  a speculative attack on  an asset price fixing scheme 
which causes a discontinuous asset shift in private agents’ portfolios. 
The run occurs because of agents’ belief that the nature of the price 
fixing regime will  change, thereby causing a discontinuous shift in 
asset rates of return. (p. 4) 
In the case of a bank run, the price under attack is the price of deposits 
fixed in terms of currency. In a world of perfect foresight, the required 
asset exchange will be carefully arranged in an orderly manner far in 
advance of the event, as, for example, in the case of a run on a banking 25  The Contribution of A  Monetary Histwy 
system insured by a central bank as lender of last resort. In that case 
the run will end through the sudden acquisition of bank assets by the 
central bank. A  “panic”  characterizes a  run  whose timing was not 
perfectly foreseen. In such a case there may be discontinuous shifts in 
asset prices and unanticipated  capital gains or losses on some assets. 
According to Diamond and Dybvig (1983), in a world of asymmetric 
information,  banks are able to transform illiquid financial assets into 
liquid ones by offering liabilities with a different, smoother pattern of 
returns over  time. Banks provide efficient risk sharing which the private 
market cannot provide. However, the illiquidity of bank assets also 
subjects banks to the vulnerability of runs. A run can be triggered by 
any random event because rational depositors not wishing to be last 
in line will rush to convert deposits into currency. 
Waldo (1985) develops a model in the Diamond and Dybvig mold 
which explains two empirical regularities associated with banking runs 
observed by Friedman and Schwartz: a rise in short-term interest rates 
and a fall in the deposit-currency ratio in anticipation of a possible run. 
The rise in short-term interest rates occurs because banks attempt to 
meet withdrawals by selling long-term securities before maturity. Yields 
on short-term assets rise in concert. The fall in the deposit-currency 
ratio in anticipation of a possible run occurs because, in the event of 
a run, the banks’ losses on the premature sale of their long-term se- 
curities eventually  force them to default on some of their deposits. 
Savers shift from deposits to currency in anticipation of possible runs 
to partially protect themselves against this risk. 
Smith (1987) also constructs a model of nationwide banking panics 
in  the Diamond-Dybvig  vein,  which  captures many  features of  the 
national banking system. Key features of the model are the assumptions 
of geographically dispersed unit banking, nationwide linkages of unit 
banks through the inverted pyramid of reserves held in  reserve and 
central reserve city banks, and interest payments on deposits and loans 
not state contingent. 
Based on these assumptions, Smith demonstrates how  exogenous 
shocks that caused unit banks to withdraw interbank deposits could 
produce panics. According to Smith, the key reason for a nationwide 
panic was the holding of bankers’ balances by a central reserve agent. 
The absence of this feature, he argues, explains why nationwide bank- 
ing panics did not occur in the free banking era. Moreover, following 
Friedman and Schwartz, Smith argues that the added severity of the 
panics of 1930-33  can be explained by the existence of the Fed. Banks 
did not consider suspending convertibility of deposits into currency as 
they had done during the national banking era. 
Smith’s interpretation of history differs from the record in two im- 
portant respects: there were panics in 1819, 1837, 1839, 1847, and 1857, 26  Michael D. Bordo 
and interbank balances  were a feature of the pre-Civil  War banking 
system. His model implies that nationwide branch banking systems will 
not be subject to panics, notwithstanding the contrary experiences of 
Austria, Germany, and other central European countries in  193  1. 
In a slightly different vein, but on rational expectations lines, Gorton 
(1984b) argues that banking panics are not unique events, as described 
by Friedman and Schwartz, but represent a rational response by de- 
positors who wish to smooth their consumption flows over time. Ra- 
tional depositors plan to dissave in periods of expected low consumption, 
such as at business cycle troughs. The likelihood of  suspensions of 
convertibility would also be highest in mid-contraction, so depositors 
will  rush  to convert their  deposits to currency  when  they  expect a 
trough to occur. 
To  provide  evidence  that  rational  depositors  will  increase  the 
currency-deposit ratio (precipitate a banking panic) when they expect 
a business cycle trough  to occur, Gorton (1984b) regresses the cur- 
rency-deposit ratio during the  national  banking era (1873- 1914) on 
measures of  the expected  return  on  deposits, the  variance  of  that 
return, and a variable  acting as a signal  of  the covariance  of  con- 
sumption and capital losses on deposits-the  unexpected shock com- 
ponent of  failed business liabilities.6 His finding of  a significant and 
positive coefficient on the failed liabilities variable is consistent with 
his hypothesis. Moreover, findings that panics coincided  with dates 
of the largest values of the shocks in the liabilities of failed businesses, 
and  that  the  shocks  came  after  business  cycle  peaks  and  before 
troughs in all panics except 1895, lead him to conclude that the failed 
business  liability  shock  was  a  cause  of  panics.  Friedman  and 
Schwartz’s hypothesis is that panics were due to unanticipated  fail- 
ures of financial institutions, often holding assets of failed nonfinancial 
firms. 
A problem with Gorton’s approach is that if depositors could predict 
a panic, should there have been panics? If depositors could predict pan- 
ics, why could banks, equally vulnerable during panics, not predict them? 
In addition, panics did not necessarily occur in all situations that were 
otherwise equivalent. In some, predictable  signals to market partici- 
pants of institutional readiness to provide additional funds promptly 
nipped an incipient panic in the bud, as in 1884 (Schwartz 1986). In oth- 
ers, no such signals were forthcoming and panic erupted. Finally, Gor- 
ton’s  approach  implies  that  a  panic  may  be  optimal  for  private 
arrangements but it will not necessarily be socially optimal. 
Restrictions of Convertibility 
Friedman and Schwartz (p. 698 and elsewhere) argue that restrictions 
of convertibility of deposits into currency by the banking system during 27  The Contribution of A  Monetary History 
the national banking era had therapeutic effects by alleviating a banking 
panic and facilitating speedy recovery. Had such an option been avail- 
able to the banks in the early  1930s, the banking panics would have 
ended before producing the massive fall in the money supply. 
Dewald (1972) disputes Friedman and Schwartz’s interpretation, in- 
stead following Sprague (1910), who opposes restriction because of the 
high costs imposed on the payments system. According to Dewald, the 
New York banks could have  reduced  their reserves to handle with- 
drawals in emergencies such as the panics of 1893 and 1907, even if it 
meant  violating  reserve requirements.  Furthermore, he alleges  that 
Friedman and Schwartz’s advocacy of  restriction in 1907, and suspen- 
sion during the Great Contraction in 1930 rather than 1933, contradicts 
their approval (on p. 698) of the issue of  emergency currency in 1914 
under the Aldrich Vreeland Act. 
In reply, Schwartz (1972) doubts that the New York banks would 
have been willing to run their reserves below the legal limit without a 
change in the law. Moreover, even if  the New York banks had been 
willing to run  deficits,  what  mattered  was their  own preference  for 
liquidity in a panic.  For Friedman and Schwartz (1963a) suspension 
was a second-best solution if  no institutions existed to increase high- 
powered money.’  In 1914, Aldrich Vreeland currency was available. 
In the 1930s, the Fed could have created high-powered money but did 
not do so; therefore, early restriction was preferable to deflation. 
According to Gorton (1985b), in a world of rational expectations but 
limited information, restriction of convertibility represents an optimal 
arrangement between banks and customers to allay an incipient panic. 
With  limited information, bank  customers monitor a noisy  signal of 
banks’ investments,  e.g., the failures of important nonfinancial firms 
or the liabilities of failed companies. A panic is then a rational response 
to movements in this indicator because depositors fear capital losses 
on their deposits. Restriction is a way in which banks indicate to cus- 
tomers that their investments are sound. 
Clearinghouses 
Friedman and Schwartz  (chapters 3 and 4) discuss the private market 
lender-of-last-resort role of  the New York Clearing House and other 
clearinghouse associations  in  issuing  clearinghouse  loan  certificates 
during panics. Timberlake (1984) and Gorton (1984a) describe how the 
New York Clearing House evolved ways to restore confidence in bank 
deposits during financial crises. Issuing clearinghouse loan certificates 
in  1873, based on the discounted collateral of  member banks’ earning 
assets, released the greenbacks  that otherwise would  have been tied 
up in interbank settlements to satisfy depositors’ demands. Later, in 
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exchange for loan certificates. The system provided depositors insur- 
ance that individual bank failures would not impose a liquidity squeeze 
on other banks. 
For Gorton (l985a)  the development of the clearinghouse on the lines 
of  Coase (1937) was a  response to the idiosyncratic,  agent-specific 
nature of demand deposits. Unlike bank notes, these instruments do 
not possess the information qualities requisite to developing a market. 
During a panic, according to Gorton, the clearinghouse association, by 
quickly organizing all member banks into one firm, established a coin- 
surance scheme that made  it difficult for the public  to focus on the 
weakness of an individual member. The clearinghouse could also allay 
the panic by issuing loan certificates which acted as close substitutes 
for high-powered money. 
In sum, Friedman and Schwartz’s treatment of banking panics has 
spawned interesting theoretical research. A key integrating element in 
these papers is the assumption of asymmetric information, an assump- 
tion implicit in Friedman and Schwartz’s treatment. A second element 
is the importance of real world institutional features-the  absence of 
a lender of last resort, unit banking, the inverted pyramid of credit, 
and restrictions  on the interest that banks can pay  on deposits and 
charge on loans-all  features stressed in A Monetary History. The third 
element that emerges from this approach is the asserted predictability 
of panics in sharp contrast to Friedman and Schwartz’s view of them 
as unique events. 
1.3.2  The Great Contraction, 1929-33 
The Great Contraction of 1929-33,  characterized by a one-third de- 
cline in the stock of money, prices, and output, was the most severe 
and prolonged contraction in U.S. history. It quickly became worldwide 
in scope. For Friedman and Schwartz (chapter 7) monetary forces were 
paramount in explaining it. The key ingredient of the monetary collapse 
was a series of banking crises which led to the closing of one-third of 
the nation’s banks. In terms of the proximate determinants of the money 
supply, the decline in  M  was  produced by  declines  in  the deposit- 
currency and deposit-reserve ratios. 
Friedman and Schwartz  highlighted several episodes during 1929-33: 
(a) The stock market crash of October 1929 and the year succeeding 
it. Concern with  stock market speculation, combined with a conflict 
between the New York Fed and the Federal Reserve Board (see section 
1.4 below), had led to a rise in the discount rate in  1928; too little to 
stem speculation, but sufficient to reduce money growth below trend 
and induce deflation. The resultant  sharp decline in output from Oc- 
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(b) Thefirst banking crisis, October 1930 to March 1931. A series of 
bank failures in the south and midwest led to an attempt by the public 
to convert their  deposits  into currency. This attempted  conversion 
produced “a contagion of fear” that spread through the corresponding 
banking system to the whole country, culminating in the collapse of 
the Bank of United States in December 1930. 
(c) The second banking  crisis, March to June 1931. This crisis was 
similar to the first banking crisis but, because of the weakened capital 
structure of the banks, the effects were more severe. 
(d) Britain’s departure from the gold standard in September 1931. 
An  external drain, to which the Fed reacted by  raising the discount 
rate, ignored Bagehot’s rule to lend freely but at a penalty rate, thereby 
exacerbating the internal drain. 
(e) The $1 billion open market purchase the Fed  conducted, under 
congressional pressure,  from April to June 1932. The policy succeeded 
in offsetting the effects of the fall in the money supply but was short- 
lived. 
(f) The banking holiday of  March 1933.The cumulation of previous 
banking panics weakened the banking system. Internal drains plus ru- 
mors of  departure from the gold standard led for the first time to a 
domestic demand for gold combined with an external drain, precipi- 
tating the nationwide  banking holiday. (According to Friedman and 
Schwartz, the  banking holiday was much  worse than  restriction of 
payments under the national banking system. Then only some types 
of  payments-those  involving the  conversion  of  deposits  into  cur- 
rency-were  restricted. In the banking holiday, all payments were re- 
stricted, throwing the economy into paralysis.) 
The survey that follows examines the literature on the Great Con- 
traction that A Monetary History stimulated, which includes new inter- 
pretations of the origins of the contraction: Peter Temin’s (1976) critique 
of the monetary approach and the subsequent debate, a reiteration of 
the position taken in A Monetary History by Schwartz (1981), a rein- 
terpretation of  the banking holiday of  1933, and recent studies of the 
recovery. 
Origins of  the Great Contraction 
Hamilton (1987a) provides evidence consistent with Friedman and 
Schwartz that the contraction started with tight monetary policy be- 
ginning in  1928. He stresses two factors: policy to stem stock market 
speculation and a gold drain in  1929 to France after it returned to the 
gold standard at a parity that undervalued the franc. 
According to Meltzer (1976), expansionary monetary policy from 
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countries (i.e., prices in the United States declined less than in other 
gold  standard countries). This produced a current account deficit, a 
gold outflow, and a decline in the money supply in  1928-29. 
Field (1984a) contends that the increase in the volume of asset ex- 
changes associated with speculation in the stock market markedly raised 
the transactions demand for money in the 1920s. Using monthly data 
over the period 1919-29,  he finds that the level of trading on the New 
York Stock Exchange, holding constant income and interest rates, had 
significant effects  on the demand for narrow  money  (currency plus 
demand deposits). A dynamic simulation of the model shows  an upward 
shift of 17 percent in demand deposits in New York City due to asset 
exchanges. Had the Fed been aware of the effects of this upward shift 
in the demand for money in  raising interest rates, according to Field, 
it would not have engaged in as contractionary a policy to offset the 
speculative  boom  as it  did. Because it  ignored  the effects  of  stock 
exchange transactions on the demand for money, the Fed tolerated high 
interest rates, with devastating effects on the construction and auto- 
mobile industries. Both industries turned down before the stock market 
crash, precipitating the Great Depression (Field I984b). 
The Temin Debate 
In A Monetary History, Friedman and Schwartz  attribute the massive 
decline in prices and real output in the U.S. from 1929 to 1933 to an 
unprecedented decline in the quantity of money.8 The fall in the money 
stock, attributable to a  shift to currency from deposits, was  largely 
caused by bank failures in 1930-31  and 1933. Temin (1976), however, 
counters that the bank failures could not have caused the fall in the 
quantity of money since there was no evidence of a rise in short-term 
interest rates during 1929-31 (in fact, short-term rates fell). In his view, 
a fall  in  income produced by  a decline in  autonomous consumption 
expenditures led to a fall in the demand for money which, interacting 
with an interest-elastic money supply function, produced the fall in the 
money stock and in short-term interest rates. 
Against  Friedman and  Schwartz’s money  hypothesis, Temin  first 
propounds reserve causality. Because changes in  the money  supply 
affect interest rates and income, but money demand is also determined 
by interest rates and income, it is possible that nonmonetary forces 
that reduced the level of income could have reduced the demand for 
money, in turn causing a fall in the money   up ply.^ 
Three sources  provide evidence for the money hypothesis: Anderson 
and Butkiewicz (1980), Schwartz (l981), and Evans (1985). Estimates 
of a structural model for 1921-33  showed bank failures had a greater 
effect on money  supply (via their influence on the currency-deposit 31  The Contribution of A  Monetary History 
ratio) than on money demand (Anderson and Butkiewicz). Moreover, 
bank failures were explained not by income but by lagged bank failures 
(suggesting the Fed might have been at fault). Money Granger-causes 
income  but  not  the  reverse,  based  on  monthly  data for  1919-39 
(Schwartz). According to estimated vector autoregressions also using 
monthly data, demand deposits during the Great Depression were not 
related to past output, prices, or interest rates (determinants of money 
demand), but were related to bank reserves and were a proxy for the 
marginal cost of funds (determinants of money supply) (Evans). 
Two sources provide evidence for significant contemporaneous feed- 
back from income to money and a passive money supply: Gordon and 
Wilcox (1981) and Boughton and Wicker (1979). According to Gordon 
and Wilcox, who used both quarterly and monthly data for 1920-41, 
lagged money significantly caused income (GNP), lagged income had 
no effect on money, but the correlation  between money and income 
was significant contemporaneously.  lo 
Evidence against Friedman and Schwartz’s view that bank failures 
were a key cause of the unprecedented rise in the deposit currency 
ratio was that they accounted for only about a third of the  1930-33 
rise (Boughton and Wicker  1979, in a regression using quarterly data 
for 1921-36).  Moreover, the substantial fraction of the variation in the 
currency-deposit ratio due to interest rates and income suggested to 
these critics that there must have been important feedback from income 
to money.  I  I 
Temin’s second argument against the money hypothesis is that bank 
failures in 1930 could not have been the precipitating cause of the Great 
Depression because they had themselves been caused by a previous 
decline in economic activity. Friedman and Schwartz attribute the ini- 
tial  bank  failures in  U.S. agricultural regions to poor loans and  in- 
vestments in the 1920s. Temin concludes, however, based on a regression 
explaining bank  failures across states for the years 1929,  1930, and 
1931, that previous bank  suspensions were not significant whereas a 
measure of agricultural income (cotton income) was. Thus, according 
to Temin, a depression-induced  decline in  agricultural income was a 
key cause of bank failures, not previous bad loans. 
Temin’s view is not sustained by Wicker (1980), who demonstrates 
forcefully that the banking panic in the autumn of 1930 was triggered 
by the collapse of Caldwell and Company in Nashville, attributable to 
its “weak and precarious financial state on the eve of the depression,” 
and not to the decline in agricultural income. The collapse of Caldwell 
quickly led to the suspension of  numerous Caldwell-related banks across 
the South. According to Wicker, the collapse of the Caldwell financial 
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ratio as postulated by Friedman and Schwartz, which in turn contrib- 
uted  to the spread of confusion and fear that produced  the panic of 
October 1930 to March  1931.12 
Temin’s view that the 1930 bank failures were not explained by pre- 
vious bank failures is also not sustained. Significance tests by Stauffer 
(1981) show that  the trend  of  state bank failure rates,  1928-29,  did 
carry over into 1930. Moreover, for twelve states where cotton pro- 
duction was important, rank correlations between measures of  bank 
failures, farm income, and measures of  weakness of the banking sys- 
tem, suggest that the banking structure of  the rural states rather than 
income was the key determinant of  bank failures. 
Finally, micro data on national banks, assembled by  White (1984), 
explains the bank failures of 1927, 1928, 1929, and 1930 by the structure 
of  the banking  system. The results of  a logit  model  show that  the 
increase in  the number  of  bank  failures did  not  represent  a radical 
departure from the 1920s. In the 1920s, many rural banks carried assets 
whose expected future value had declined. The coincidence of  tight 
money and the weakening of asset positions due to deteriorating con- 
ditions in  agriculture  led to the failure of  many  small unit banks in 
sparsely populated  rural areas, a result consistent with both Temin’s 
and Friedman and Schwartz’s positions. However, the key cause of 
bank  weakness,  according to White,  was  the prohibition  of  branch 
banking in most of these states. The case of Canada, which experienced 
a  similar decline  in  agricultural  income  but  had  nationwide  branch 
banking and no bank failures, makes the point. 
Temin  also argues that  the value  of  banks’  portfolios reflected  a 
depression-induced increase in the riskiness of bonds (measured by the 
differential between  Baa and Aaa corporate bond  yields for a fixed 
sample of bonds).  Mayer’s (1978a) criticism of this point is that, al- 
though  the  yield  on  high  grade  bonds did  not  increase  significantly 
between July and December 1930, it is unlikely that banks held many 
risky Baa bonds on which yields did increase by one percentage point. 
In sympathy with Temin, White (1984) finds that the portfolios of state 
banks in Vermont, which held only small portions of  U.S. government 
securities, were susceptible to a decline in value. 
Temin has been further challenged for holding that the money mul- 
tiplier was sufficiently interest-elastic that it would have fallen in  re- 
sponse to a fall in money demand. Mayer (1978a) finds little evidence 
of  response of the deposit-reserve ratio to a fall in interest rates, and 
only moderate evidence of a response by the deposit-currency ratio- 
for semi-annual periods of low interest rates from 191 3-30-confirming 
Cagan’s (1965) earlier evidence of  interest inelasticity of  the money 
m~ltiplier.’~  Mayer also argues that, as declining income reduces the 
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would have the effect, after some lag, of raising income and, hence, 
money demand.I4 
Temin’s third  argument  against  the money  hypothesis is  that  the 
short-term commercial paper rate, which declined in 1930, should have 
risen. He explains the rise in other interest rates by an increase in risk 
rather than a scramble for liquidity. In his view, the fall in  nominal 
interest rates could not be masking a deflation-expectation-induced rise 
in  ex  ante real  rates  because  contemporary  evidence  suggests  that 
expectations were sanguine until mid-193  1 .I5 
Schwartz (1981) criticizes Temin’s (and other Keynesians’) use of 
short-term interest rates as a measure of the price of money. She shows 
that monthly data for the inverse of the price level-a  true measure of 
the price of money, according to monetarists-over  the interwar period 
mirrored all monetary events. She attributes the decline in the short- 
term commercial paper rate in  the face of  bank  panics to increased 
demand by banks for commercial paper as collateral for borrowing to 
meet their need for reserves. However, for Mayer (1978a) the evidence 
is unclear, even though the decline in short-term rates likely reflected 
a shift into short-term securities for liquidity motives, outweighing a 
shift from short-term securities to money. He concludes that the mon- 
etary explanation is vulnerable on this issue. 
Gandolfi and Lothian (1979) find Temin’s use of  interest rates mis- 
leading because of  the procyclical pattern of  the rates that tends to 
mask the liquidity effect of  monetary change. Moreover, they argue 
that the 12 percent decline of the wholesale price index that occurred 
between August 1929 and August 1930 was substantial enough to have 
created expectations of a continued decline in prices in the short run. 
For Meltzer (1976), Temin neglects, as did the Federal Reserve Sys- 
tem during the Great Depression, the distinction between nominal and 
real interest rates, misinterpreting the fall in interest rates as indicating 
monetary ease. 
It should be pointed out that, had Temin started his analysis in April 
1928 when the Federal Reserve sharply reduced the rate of monetary 
growth, instead of in August 1929, he would have observed a rise in 
short-term interest rates between March 1928 and September 1929. As 
the lagged effects of monetary change affected prices  and output in 
1929, interest rates then declined.I6 
Temin’s final argument against the money hypothesis is that the real 
money supply did not fall. Monetary forces, it follows, could not pos- 
sibly explain the massive decline in real income that occurred. 
According to Gandolfi and Lothian (1979), Temin confuses desired 
and actual real cash balances. They estimate a money-demand function, 
using annual data over the periods  1900-29  and 1900-41,  that shows 
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1931-33,  by magnitudes similar to the movements in actual real bal- 
ances.  They conclude that both  the  initial  rise and  the subsequent 
decline were due to changes in the determinants of money  demand, 
offering evidence suggesting  that movements in actual  real  balances 
are a poor measure of the degree of monetary ease or restraint. 
In place of the money hypothesis, Temin substitutes a modified ver- 
sion of “the spending hypothesis.” According to the original Keynesian 
version, a fall in  income and  prices was produced by  the multiplier 
effects of a fall in autonomous spending (consumption and investment), 
supposedly caused by an oversupply of housing and the stock market 
crash. In Temin’s view, however, though the crash reduced consump- 
tion  through  adverse effects on the community’s wealth, it was not 
crucial. He does not find evidence of a massive decline in investment 
expenditures, but judges that an unexplained decline in autonomous 
consumption expenditures was the likely cause of the decline in eco- 
nomic activity during 1929-31.  The  judgment is based on an unusually 
large negative residual for 1930 from a consumption function for the 
interwar period (1919-41).  After 1930, following Kindleberger (1973), 
Temin regards international forces as dominant. 
Mayer (1978b) replicates Temin’s consumption function regression- 
excluding 1919, a transition year from war to peace-and  finds the 1930 
residual  is  no longer  negative.”  Using  estimates of  a  consumption 
function he judges to be superior-the  MPS model-over  the period 
1921-41,  in both levels and first differences and including a dummy 
variable  to account for the  1930 shift,  Mayer finds he  is  unable  to 
establish Temin’s hypothesis of an unusual downward shift in the con- 
sumption function in 1930. Gandolfi and Lothian (1979) show that the 
change in the residual for 1930 was far from unique compared to all 
contractions in the longer period, based on a permanent income con- 
sumption function for the period  1889- 1941. 
In sum, the Temin debate leaves monetary forces as the key cause 
of the Great Depression. The evidence on causality is generally in favor 
of the money hypothesis, but the contemporaneous correlation between 
money  and  income also allows  scope for nonmonetary forces. The 
evidence does not sustain Temin’s view that the bank failures of 1930 
were caused by the depression-induced decline in agricultural income 
and depression-increased  riskiness of bank  portfolios.  However, the 
Stauffer  and White studies that attribute the bank failures to weak bank 
structure in agricultural regions are consistent with both the Temin and 
Friedman and Schwartz accounts. Temin’s contention that the decline 
in  short-term interest rates during  1929-31  is  inconsistent  with  the 
money hypothesis has also been rejected, but why short-term nominal 
rates declined has not been definitively answered. Finally, neither Tem- 
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contradicts the money hypothesis nor his suggestion of an unexplained 
decline in consumption as the source of contraction has won acceptance. 
A Reappraisal by Anna Schwartz 
According to Schwartz (1981), the Great Depression was started by 
two unexpected shocks of monetary origin: a contractionary monetary 
policy in 1928, initiated by the Federal Reserve to  halt the stock market 
boom, and the stock market crash of October 1929. Unexpected de- 
clines in aggregate demand would lead employers to hire fewer workers 
at each real wage perceived by them, and workers to refuse offers of 
employment at lower nominal  wages on the basis  of  no change in 
expectations. But eventually, on the assumption of rational expecta- 
tions, a new equilibrium  would be reached as expectations were re- 
vised. Other things being equal, the result would have been a severe 
contraction similar  to earlier  contractions.  But  instead, the  conse- 
quence of inappropriate Fed policy generated a further series of mon- 
etary  shocks-most  notably  the banking  panics of  1930, 1931, and 
1933-which  in turn led to further declines in output and the demand 
for labor, and a shift in demand for securities to both short-term in- 
struments and high grade long-term securities.  l8 
The Banking Huliday of  1933 
Wigmore  (1987) challenges  the  view  espoused by  Friedman and 
Schwartz that domestic factors were the primary cause of the banking 
holiday of March 1933, and instead posits rumors of devaluation as the 
key factor. Though Friedman and Schwartz discuss the role of rumors 
of devaluation in converting the internal drain into a demand for gold, 
they do not view it as the primary cause of the panic. Wigmore argues 
that rumors of devaluation appearing weeks before the banking holi- 
day-events  such as bills in Congress proposing to devalue the dollar, 
statements by  leading financial figures,  and FDR’s  unwillingness  to 
commit himself to the current exchange rate-triggered  the run on the 
dollar. The run manifested itself in both an internal and foreign demand 
for gold by individuals and central banks.  l9  Furthermore, he argues 
that though  the increase in currency was three times the amount of 
gold  reserves lost  by  the New  York  Fed, the fact that  gold  losses 
threatened to reduce the Fed’s reserves below the legal limit-while 
at the same time it had a virtually unlimited ability to meet demands 
for domestic currency-was  crucial. 
Wigmore also attributes the calm which  immediately followed the 
banking holiday  to the Roosevelt  administration’s  international  poli- 
cies: the embargo on gold ownership and export, and restrictions on 
foreign exchange dealings. The former cut off the domestic channels 
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the dollar in the ensuing three months removed the source of the spec- 
ulative pressure. 
The Recovery 
The recovery from 1933 to 1937 was marked by rapid money growth 
(53 percent) and  rapid  inflation  (50 percent for the wholesale  price 
index). Friedman and Schwartz (chapter 9) attribute the monetary ex- 
pansion to an increase in the monetary gold stock in response to the 
devaluation of the dollar, the gold purchase program, and capital flight 
from Europe. At the same time, they argue, rising prices and wages 
represented in part a rare case of cost-push inflation, the consequence 
of the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) and other policies that 
encouraged unionization and monopolization. These policies, with the 
gold-induced monetary expansion acting as an accommodating force, 
encouraged inflation at the expense of real growth. 
In support of Friedman and Schwartz, Weinstein (1981) finds that 
the New Deal NIRA codes (1933-39,  which encouraged the formation 
of labor unions and the cartelization of industry, reduced output and 
raised unemployment more than would have otherwise been the case. 
First, by increasing wages relative to prices, the codes increased un- 
employment  by  2 percent. Second, by  raising  the price  level  by  an 
amount responsive to the 14 percent increase in the money supply that 
occurred during  1933-35,  the codes prevented output from rising 8 
percent and unemployment from declining 3 percent. Third, the codes- 
induced rise in the price level, by reducing the real value of financial 
assets, led to an additional 6 to 11 percent decline in output. 
However, McCloskey and Zecher (1984) deny that the inflation  of 
1933-34  can be attributed to a wage-price-spiral  induced by the New 
Deal NIRA codes since the majority of the codes were enforced after 
the price level rose.  Based on an examination  of weekly data, they 
contend that the key cause of the price burst was the devaluation by 
the Roosevelt administration.20 
Friedman (1984) in rebuttal cites statements from A Monetary His- 
tory (pp. 465-66)  which attribute considerable importance to the gold 
policy as a causal factor in the inflation, emphasizes that Friedman and 
Schwartz’s concern was with the entire period of 1933-37,  and dem- 
onstrates that McCloskey and Zecher’s factual evidence involved the 
inappropriate use of arithmetic scales in comparing weekly movements 
in wholesale prices and the exchange rate-a  logarithmic scale would 
give a more accurate picture, and would portray narrower movements 
in the wholesale price index (WPI) than the exchange rate. 
The literature on the Great Depression  spawned  by  A  Monetary 
History suggests varied explanations  of its causes, duration, and se- 
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is the primacy of  monetary forces. However, contemporaneous cor- 
relation between money and income has been interpreted as evidence 
for significant feedback from nonmonetary to monetary forces. In ad- 
dition, nonmonetary forces, especially institutional factors such as the 
regulations governing banking structure, emerge as having considerable 
importance, and some authors such as Bernanke (1983) (see section 
1.3.1 above) stress the disruption of the financial system as an important 
independent cause. 
Evidence of the endogeneity  of the money  supply or of  feedback 
from real forces to the money supply begs the question of whether the 
Great Depression had to happen. As Friedman and Schwartz point out, 
the Fed clearly could have stopped the decline in the money supply 
and the depression with it. A comparison of the Great Depression with 
previous and subsequent experience suggests that monetary contrac- 
tion was the sine qua non that made the depression great. Other ex- 
planations do not detract from the importance of monetary contraction 
which has been a crucial part of all severe cycles. Given the importance 
of a decline in the money supply, other influences-including  the dis- 
ruption of  the financial system-became,  in most cases, endogenous 
rather than causal. 
1.4  The Domestic Monetary Framework and Monetary Policy 
A key theme in A Monetary History is the role of banking arrange- 
ments and monetary policy  in providing a setting for monetary dis- 
turbances. In this section, the literature is surveyed for both the pre- 
1914 period when the United States did not have a central bank, and 
the period since 1914 when monetary policy has been conducted by 
the Federal Reserve System. 
1.4.1  The National Banking Era 
Inelasticity of  High-powered Money 
A key problem that faced the national banking system, which ulti- 
mately led to its replacement by the Federal Reserve System, was the 
inelasticity  of  high-powered money; that  is, the inability to convert 
deposits into currency during banking panics.  This problem was ex- 
acerbated  by  “the inverted pyramid  of  credit”-interbank  deposits 
held in  New York and, to a lesser extent, Chicago and St. Louis. In 
times of financial stringency, country banks would recall deposits from 
the central reserve cities to meet local demands for currency, in  turn 
exacerbating pressure on the reserves of those banks. 
Cagan (1963)  agrees with Friedman and Schwartz that the main defect 
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the problem was solved by the creation of emergency currency through 
the Aldrich Vreeland Act. In addition, he argues that minimum reserve 
requirements did not reduce monetary instability because banks viewed 
these reserves as locked up. For Cagan, the inverted pyramid of credit 
was not as serious a situation as commonly believed because the call 
loan market, in which interbank deposits were invested, would  have 
attracted the funds anyway.  The central  problem  with  the inverted 
pyramid was that it  raised the money  multiplier, thereby allowing a 
greater monetary contraction than would otherwise have occurred in 
the face of an attempt by the public to convert its deposits into currency. 
Dewald (1972) contends that the United States had virtually all the 
elements of a central bank in place with the national banking system. 
The New York City national banks, by serving as a depository for other 
banks, acted as a central reserve. In addition, they acted as a lender 
of last resort by providing interbank loans, by channeling specie from 
abroad and from the Treasury to other banks, and by banding together 
and issuing clearinghouse certificates. Schwartz (1972) denies that the 
New York banks functioned  as a central  bank  since they could not 
issue high-powered money at will. Furthermore, interbank loans and 
clearinghouse  loan  certificates  did  not  represent  additions  to high- 
powered money, but rather substituted for it. 
The National Bank Note Puzzle 
National bank notes representing liabilities of the national banks were 
issued by banks depositing government securities with the U.S.  Trea- 
sury equal in face value (before 1900) to  11  1  percent of the value of 
the notes issued.  The amount of the notes issued  depended on the 
market prices of the securities serving as collateral. As long as bonds 
sold at or above par,  it was profitable  to issue notes. Based on cal- 
culations in Cagan (1965), Friedman and Schwartz note that, except 
for the period  from  1884 to  1891, eligible U.S. securities  sold above 
par for the entire fifty years before  establishment  of the Fed.*’ The 
amount of notes issued varied with their profitability, yet the amount 
was well below the maximum. Friedman and Schwartz view this as a 
puzzle: “[elither bankers did not recognize a profitable course of action 
. . .  or we have overlooked some costs of  issue that appeared large to 
them” (p. 24). 
Goodhart’s (1965) explanation for less than the maximum possible 
note issue for the period  1907-13  is uncertainty over the possibility 
that circulation privileges would be terminated in forthcoming reform 
legislation, which reduced the value that banks attached to bonds serv- 
ing as collateral. For James (1976), the reason for the less-than-maximum 
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rate of return on loans was sufficiently high to make it more profitable 
to make loans through creating  deposits, rather than buying government 
bonds and then issuing notes (in the form of loans) on the basis of 90 
percent of par value. Local loan rates were higher in the south and the 
west than in central reserve cities, accounting for the lower fraction 
of the maximum note issue in these regions. As loan rates converged 
towards the end of the nineteenth century, national banks in the interior 
increased their note issue. 
1.4.2  Founding of the Federal Reserve System 
A Change in Regime 
The beginning of operations by the Fed in November 1914 marked 
a “major watershed” in U.S.  monetary history. According to Friedman 
and Schwartz (p. 9), the change in  internal  monetary arrangements 
coincided with a loosening of the external link to the gold standard. 
These two changes created the potential for the new central bank to 
exercise deliberate  control over the stock of money and to promote 
monetary stability. Yet, the record of subsequent events and greater 
variability of money after 1914 than before, led them to conclude that 
“[tlhe blind, undesigned and quasi-automatic working of the gold stan- 
dard turned out to produce a  greater measure of  predictability  and 
regularity-perhaps  because its discipline  was impersonal  and  ines- 
capable-than  did deliberate  and conscious control exercised within 
institutional  arrangements intended  to promote monetary stability” 
(P. 15). 
Mankiw, Miron, and Weil(l987)  demonstrate that a significant change 
in monetary regime actually occurred when the Fed began to operate, 
as evidenced in the behavior of interest rates, and that market agents 
rationally anticipated  the change. They show that the stochastic  process 
of the 3-month time loan rate at New York City banks changed from 
mean reversion with a strong seasonal from 1890 to 1910, to close to 
a random walk from 1921 to 1933. This, they argue, reflected the Fed’s 
role in  offsetting seasonal  and panic-induced  fluctuations in  interest 
rates. Evidence of  low posterior odds ratios  (the ratio of subjective 
probabilities of different switch dates conditioning on the data) before 
December 1914, according to the authors, casts doubt that abandon- 
ment of the gold standard in August  1914 explains the change in sto- 
chastic process. Moreover, they found that the relationship between 
6-month and 3-month rates changed in a manner consistent with the 
expectations theory of the term structure. Regressions of the long rate 
on the short rate revealed the former to be less responsive to shocks 
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the change in stochastic process to have occurred between December 
1914 and February 1915, and the change in  expectations to have pre- 
ceded the regime change by one month. 
A Change in the Seasonal Pattern of Interest Rates 
The seasonal in short-term rates under the national banking system 
reflected autumnal crop moving and Christmas demands for currency 
which put pressure on bank reserves and hence on interest rates. The 
Fed reduced the seasonal in  short-term interest rates, altering its out- 
standing credit to offset seasonal fluctuations in bank reserves, and at 
the same time, increased the seasonal in currency outside the Treasury 
and  the  Fed  and in  high-powered money  (Friedman and Schwartz, 
More recently, evidence for a significant decrease in nominal interest 
rate seasonality after 1914 was found by Shiller (1980), who used the 
X-1 1 1 seasonal adjustment program, and by Mankiw and Miron (1986) 
and Mankiw, Miron, and Weil (1987), who used time-series methods. 
According  to Miron  (1986), financial panics  in  the  United  States 
before  1914 generally occurred at seasonal peaks in nominal interest 
rates. This reflected the tendency of  seasonal demands for credit to 
raise interest rates, increasing the ratio of loans to reserves and deposits 
to reserves. Panics precipitated by exogenous shocks occurred at times 
when banks were  least  prepared.  After  1914, however,  the Fed  ex- 
tended reserve bank credit to accommodate seasonal credit demands, 
thereby considerably reducing the amplitude of  the seasonal interest 
rate cycle and preventing any panics from occurring between 1914 and 
1929. On grounds similar to Trescott (1982) and Field (1984a), Miron 
associated banking panics after 1929 with a shift to a restrictive policy 
and the reduction of seasonal accommodation.22 
Because a similar reduction in seasonality occurred in a large number 
of countries at the same time, Clark (1986) is skeptical of the Friedman 
and Schwartz view that it was the advent of  the Fed that accounted 
for the reduction in the seasonal in short-term interest rates. Moreover, 
the disappearance of the U.S.  and U .K. interest-rate seasonal occurred 
three years before a significant seasonal appeared in total currency and 
high-powered money in each country. Though the reduction in the U.S. 
interest-rate  seasonal from  1914 to  1916 might be  explained  by  the 
liquidity effects of  reduced reserve requirements and gold inflows, Clark 
doubts that U.S. seasonal policy could explain a similar phenomenon 
in other countries. Instead, he attributes the timing of  the change in 
the seasonal pattern of interest rates in  1914 to the breakdown of the 
gold standard. 
Clark’s view, however, is challenged by Barsky, Mankiw, Miron, and 
Weil(l988). Evidence that the seasonal pattern of interest rates did not 
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change after the U.S. and U.K. left Bretton Woods in  1973, and that 
the correlation between U.S. and U.K. interest-rate levels and changes 
did not vary before or after 1914, makes their case that the reduction 
in the seasonal was unrelated to the change in  regime. Instead they 
construct a hypothetical model in which a central bank, committed to 
interest-rate smoothing and avoiding gold flows, is introduced into a 
world already containing a central bank dedicated to the same policies 
(the Bank of England). The two central banks, each pursuing its own 
policy but taking the other’s actions as given, smooth interest rates 
without gold flows. This is in  contrast to the case of a single central 
bank whose attempts to smooth interest rates will always be offset by 
gold flows. Based on this model, the authors argue, it is plausible that 
the 1914 introduction into the world monetary system of the Fed, ded- 
icated to smoothing interest  rates, can explain the reduction in  the 
interest-rate seasonal in the United States, the United Kingdom, and 
other countries. 
A fundamental problem with Barsky et al.’s explanation is that in 
1914 all countries (except the United States) had left the gold standard. 
Consequently they would not be worried about gold flows. In addition, 
the question of why the Fed was so special remains. Why could the 
Bank of England and the Bank of France, each of which represented 
large gold standard countries, not have initiated the reduction in the 
seasonal before  1914? Possibly the answer lies with the populists  in 
the United States, who influenced the constitutional structure of the 
Fed and who were strongly opposed to the seasonal. 
Founding Principles  versus Reality 
The Fed was established to provide elasticity to the money supply, 
specifically to provide easy convertibility between deposits and cur- 
rency and to prevent a recurrence of the banking panics of the national 
banking era. This goal, according to Friedman and Schwartz (chapter 
3,  was to be achieved by  the expansion and contraction of Federal 
Reserve notes and deposits. Two key principles lay behind the estab- 
lishment of  the Fed: the gold standard and the real bills doctrine.23 
West’s (1976,  1977) reading of  archival material and contemporary 
sources lead him to support Friedman and Schwartz’s interpretation 
that the two principles behind the Federal Reserve Act were obsolete 
before the Fed opened its doors. The real bills doctrine reflected early 
nineteenth century reality: the widespread use of bills of exchange and 
commercial bills. However, after the Civil War the market for com- 
mercial  bills,  especially two-name  bills,  declined.  Furthermore,  the 
classical  gold  standard principle  was based  on a stylized  model of 
observance by the Bank of England of “the rules of the game” and its 
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Bank had difficulty making Bank Rate effective and frequently violated 
“the rules” through the use of policies such as the gold devices (Sayers 
1936). Thus the Fed was designed to follow a policy which had never 
existed. 
The Fed’s First Policy Failure, 1920-21 
According to Friedman and Schwartz (p. 238), if  the Fed had raised 
the discount rate earlier in 1919, this would have moderated post-World 
War I inflation and the subsequent contraction. Fuel was added to the 
fire by further raising the discount rate in  1920 and keeping it there 
until May 1921. Thus, the years 1920-21  were the first important test 
of Fed monetary policy and its first failure. 
Friedman and Schwartz (p.  234) interpret the Fed’s  reluctance in 
1920 to reduce the discount rate after prices and output had declined 
as concern over its gold  reserve ratio.  Wicker  (1965;  1966, ch. 31, 
however,  based on his  reading  of  Federal  Reserve records, regards 
domestic considerations as more important. In his view, Fed officials 
feared that lowering the discount rate before member bank borrowing 
had been reduced to desirable levels would encourage further specu- 
lative borrowing. The Fed did not understand the harmful  effects of 
deflation, believing that, with  declining prices  and activity, member 
bank borrowing would be quickly liquidated.  Not recognized  by the 
Fed, according to Wicker, was that much of the buildup in bank credit 
financed inventories which took several months to liquidate. Wicker’s 
reading  of the archives suggests that a reinterpretation of Friedman 
and Schwartz’s view of  1920-21  may have merit. 
1.4.3  Was the Federal Reserve System’s Policy Consistent from 
1923 to 1933? 
Friedman and Schwartz (chapter 6) describe the 1920s as the “high 
tide”  of the Federal Reserve System. Though the real  bills doctrine 
still  strongly  influenced  Fed  policy,  and despite an ongoing  conflict 
between  Governor Benjamin  Strong of  the New York  Fed  and  the 
Federal  Reserve Board  that affected  all  policy  discussion, the  Fed 
successfully conducted countercyclical ~tabilization.~~  The contraction 
of 1929-33  could have been prevented if  the policies developed in the 
1920s had been consistently applied (chapter 7). Friedman and Schwartz 
attribute the policy failure to a “shift of power within the system and 
the lack of  understanding and experience of the individuals to whom 
the power shifted”  (p. 41 1). 
The only episode that took place when the system united  was the 
decision to raise the discount rate after Britain left the gold standard 
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policy in  1932 did not reflect a change in policy but rather just a tem- 
porary reaction to congressional pressure.25 The final banking panic in 
1933 demonstrated a complete lack of leadership as each reserve bank 
acted to protect its own reserves. According to Friedman and Schwartz, 
none of this would  have happened  had  Benjamin  Strong not died in 
1928 or had the pre-Fed set of monetary institutions, including restric- 
tions of payments and the Aldrich Vreeland Act, been in place. 
Wicker (1965) denies that Fed policy deteriorated dramatically after 
Strong’s  death. Based on his reading of the minutes of the Open Market 
Policy  Committee (OMPC),  unavailable  to Friedman and Schwartz 
when  they wrote their book, he concludes that the Burgess-Riefler- 
Strong doctrine of open market operations predominated  both before 
and after Strong’s death. 
According to this doctrine, commercial banks were reluctant to bor- 
row from the Fed, doing so only if in need. By engaging in open market 
sales, the Fed  could  induce banks to borrow.  When  member bank 
indebtedness rose, rates were raised and loans reduced. Through open 
market purchases, the Fed could reduce member bank borrowing. In- 
terest rates then fell and banks increased their outstanding loans and 
investments. 
The decision to conduct open market purchases depended on the 
level of member bank indebtedness in the reserve districts of New York 
and Chicago. In 1924 and 1927, member bank borrowing in these cities 
was sufficiently high to induce open market purchases, whereas in 1930 
it was comparable to or below  that of  1924 and  1927. Consequently, 
there was no need seen for action. Moreover, based on  the voting record 
of the executive committee of the OMPC in  1930, three of the four 
members who voted against  purchases had  been on Strong’s Open 
Market  Investment Committee  (OMIC)  in  the  192Os,  suggesting to 
Wicker that Strong might not have carried the day.26 
Brunner and Meltzer (1968a) support Wicker’s claim that the Burgess- 
Riefler-Strong  doctrine remained  in  place  after Strong’s  death. Ac- 
cording to their interpretation of statements by the Fed staff and mem- 
bers of the OMPC, and of reports sent to each board member and 
reserve bank president, policy was consistent over the whole period. 
Based on the Burgess-Riefler-Strong doctrine, the Fed had two policy 
indicators:  the level of borrowed reserves and short-term market in- 
terest rates. According to Brunner and Meltzer, market interest rates 
were the key policy indicator during the Great Contraction. The reason 
the Fed  failed  to increase high-powered  money  after  1929 was that 
market interest rates had fallen to levels lower than those reached in 
earlier contractions. 
Meltzer (1976) explains the majority of decisions by the Fed to pur- 
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1931, by the level of borrowing, the change in borrowing, and the level 
of short-term interest rates. Focus on nominal interest rates as mea- 
sures of  ease and tightness, according to him, ignores the distinction 
between  real and nominal variables. Thus low market interest rates, 
which may actually reflect deflationary expectations and a high real 
rate, were misinterpreted as evidence of ease. 
Trescott (1982), on the other hand, claims that Fed policy after 1929 
represented a radical departure from its policy over the period 1924-29. 
He estimates a monthly regression to explain Fed holdings of open mar- 
ket securities for the 1924-29 period by variables determining defensive 
operations and dynamic operations. He then generates levels of open 
market securities for each month in  1930-33 on the counterfactual as- 
sumption that the Fed continued its 1924-29  policy regime through 1933. 
Beginning December 1929, actual federal open market credit increas- 
ingly fell below its estimated value. Trescott attributes the changes in 
monetary policy after 1929 to a change in the structure of the OMIC. 
Before 1929, as Friedman and Schwartz argue, it was dominated by the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York. In January 1930, the OMIC (which 
consisted of the five key reserve banks) was replaced by the new OMPC, 
which included all twelve banks. This produced two blocks to effective 
decision making: (1) some of the new banks were hostile to expansion- 
ary policies, and (2) as the size of the necessary interventions increased, 
there was greater likelihood they would require the approval of the en- 
tire OMPC and the Fed Board, rather than just the discretion (as in the 
previous regime) of the New York Fed. 
Finally, to determine whether Fed policy changed in 1929-as  argued 
by Friedman and Schwartz, and Trescott-or  whether the Fed followed 
the same flawed strategy in the early  1930s as it did in the 1920s-as 
argued by  Wicker, and Brunner and Meltzer-Wheelock  (1987) tests 
whether policy reaction functions over the 1919-33 period for different 
policy tools changed significantly in  1929. In support of the Wicker- 
Brunner-Meltzer view, he finds that the Fed’s policy tools responded 
to the same indicator variables over the whole period but that  they 
responded less vigorously in the  1929-31  contraction than in  earlier 
periods.27  Again, in agreement with the above authors, he concludes 
that the Fed  did  not  conduct  expansionary open  market  purchases 
because  the  low  values  of  its  key  policy  indicators-member  bank 
borrowing and market interest rates-indicated  monetary ease. Esti- 
mated demand functions for member bank borrowing for the system 
as a whole and for each Fed district suggest that the Fed’s strategy 
was flawed. It ignored the influence of declining economic activity and 
financial crises on the demand for member bank borrowing. 
In defense of  Friedman  and  Schwartz, however, Wheelock notes 
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might have locked the system into a more restrictive monetary policy 
than otherwise. It did so by increasing the influence of officials who 
opposed expansionary open market policy relative to those who con- 
sistently advocated expansionary policies and who possibly understood 
the basic flaw in  Fed strategy. 
In sum, evidence from archival sources and from econometric re- 
action functions is not entirely in favor of A Monetary History’s inter- 
pretation of the reason Fed policy failed during the Great Contraction. 
The revisionist view suggests that the Fed failed because it followed a 
flawed policy strategy developed in the  1920s. It ran into trouble in 
1929-3 1  because  its  principal  policy  indicator-short-term  market 
rates-was  misinterpreted as a signal of ease. During the contractions 
of the 1920s, the decline in activity was so moderate that neither mem- 
ber bank borrowing nor short-term interest rates fell sufficiently for 
the Fed to refrain from an expansionary policy. This is not to say that 
superior leadership might not have jettisoned the strategy. But such an 
explanation places perhaps too much emphasis on the personality of 
one individual prevailing against institutional tradition. 
1.4.4.  New Deal Regulation of the Banking System, 1933-35 
The emergency legislation of 1933 and subsequent bank acts created 
a package to insure the stability of the banking system and prevent a 
recurrence of bank panics (Friedman and Schwartz, chapter 8). 
For Benston (1982), the New Deal legislation package of the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and regulation of commercial 
banks-specifically  the prohibition  of  interest payments on demand 
deposits and the separation of investment from commercial banking- 
represents a horse trade between the small unit banks and large money 
market banks. The small unit banks wanted deposit insurance to protect 
them from runs, and they also continued to oppose branch banking.28 
The big city banks were not interested in deposit insurance but wanted 
a prohibition of interest payments on demand deposits as a price-fixing 
arrangement.29  At the same time, the investment bankers wanted pro- 
tection from commercial bank c~mpetition.~~  New Deal legislation was 
an arrangement whereby small unit banks received FDIC plus contin- 
uation of the McFadden Act prohibition against branching, large banks 
received the prohibition of interest payments on demand deposits, and 
investment bankers received freedom from commercial bank partici- 
pation in their business. 
Recently the contribution of  federal deposit insurance to monetary 
stability has been questioned. Schwartz (1988) argues that it was price 
level stability until the mid- 1960s, rather than federal deposit insurance, 
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countries without deposit insurance also experienced financial stability. 
Given price stability, an effective lender of last resort can insure sta- 
bility with or without deposit insurance. Moreover, the flat insurance 
premium FDIC charges on deposits, regardless of risk, has in recent 
years-as  a consequence of reduced regulation of the financial sector 
in  the face of inflation-increased  the incentives for risk taking and 
hence the potential for monetary instability (Short and O’Driscoll 1983, 
Kane 1985). 
1.4.5  The Increase in Reserve Requirements, 1936-37 
In chapter 8 of A Monetary History, Friedman and Schwartz doc- 
ument the consequences of a major policy error by the Federal Reserve 
System-the  doubling of reserve requirements between  August  1936 
and March 1937-which  led to a sharp monetary contraction and reces- 
sion in  1937-38.  They  dismiss  as incorrect  the  Fed’s  liquidity-trap 
explanation of the excess reserves. According to their interpretation, 
two shifts occurred in the liquidity preferences of the banks: an increase 
in the reserve deposit ratio from 1933 to 1936 in response to the 1929- 
33 collapse; and then a second increase from 1937 to 1940 as the banks, 
viewing their increased required reserves as unavailable to them in the 
event of  a liquidity crisis, restored  their desired holdings of  excess 
reserves to the previous level. Thus Friedman and Schwartz conclude 
that the adjustment of the actual deposit reserve ratio to a change in 
the desired ratio takes up to three years. 
Horwich (1963, 1966), based on a lack of correlation between effec- 
tive reserves and bank earning assets in the mid-l930s, argues for the 
liquidity-trap interpretation of excess reserves, although Brunner (1965) 
correctly criticizes Horwich’s methodology as flawed in  its specifica- 
tion.  Morrison  (1966) provides  evidence  in  favor  of  Friedman  and 
Schwartz’s view.  Against the liquidity-trap  hypothesis,  he  provides 
evidence, first, that Canadian banks did not have excess reserves de- 
spite similar movements  of  interest rates  and real  income (see also 
Friedman and Schwartz, p. 458); second, that country member banks’ 
reserve deposit  ratios  quickly  restored  their original relationship  to 
those of nonmember banks after the reserve requirement  doubled in 
1936-37;  and third, that the elasticity of demand for excess reserves 
showed little evidence of increase as interest rates 
More recently, Wilcox (1984) estimates a demand function for excess 
reserves, based on the Tobin-Brainard model of bank asset demand and 
supply and on quarterly data for New York City member banks. In ad- 
dition to the traditional interest rate and wealth variables, he includes a 
proxy variable to capture Friedman and Schwartz’s shock hypothesis 
(that the demand curve shifted as a reaction to the liquidity crisis and 
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shock variable are found to be significant. Moreover, the interest elas- 
ticity of demand for excess reserves rises as the interest rate falls, a re- 
sult which Wilcox interprets as evidence of the liquidity-trap view. In 
accordance with Brunner’s (1965) critique of A Monetary History, Wil- 
cox finds the adjustment period to a liquidity shock to be somewhat 
shorter (two years) than that reported by Friedman and Schwartz. Fi- 
nally, simulations of the model over the 1933-40  period reveal changes 
in interest rates to explain much more of the increase in excess reserves 
than the financial shock proxies, especially after 1935. 
Wilcox’s use of a log linear demand function biases the case towards 
finding a liquidity trap. Also, omitting nonmember banks and member 
banks  outside New York  biases  the case against  the  Friedman  and 
Schwartz view. Since most bank failures occurred among smaller banks 
outside New York, one would expect the New York banks to be more 
interest-sensitive and less affected by financial shocks, given their larger 
size and more diversified portfolios. 
For at least a decade, Friedman  and Schwartz’s interpretation of 
excess reserves was accepted, although the portfolio-adjustment mech- 
anism of the banking system was questioned (Brunner  1965, Tobin, 
1965, Johnson  1965). Wilcox’s recent study, despite some problems, 
suggests that the topic is worth a deeper look. 
1.4.6  Treasury Dominance of the Federal Reserve 
Friedman and Schwartz (chapter 9) document a major shift in policy 
responsibility  from the Fed  to the Treasury  in  the aftermath of  the 
Great  Contraction.  The Fed  switched  to a passive policy (with the 
exception of the 1936-37  doubling of reserve requirements) because it 
believed the traditional tools of monetary policy to be ineffective since 
they could not reduce the excess reserves accumulated by the banking 
system. 
Toma (1982) applies the theory of  bureaucracy to explain some as- 
pects of Fed policy in  the  1930s and  1940s. According to this theory 
(see Niskanen 1971, Acheson and Chant 1973), the Fed acts to maxi- 
mize its discretionary profits-the  revenue from its open market port- 
folio-all  of which it was allowed to keep after 1933. 
The model Toma constructs predicts that the Fed will try to increase 
its share of inflation tax revenue-at  the expense of  the commercial 
banks and the Treasury-by  following policies to reduce the ratio of 
the total money stock to Federal Reserve credit. But at the same time 
it will  attempt to forestall potential intervention by the Treasury and 
the Congress by  transferring some of its resources  to the Treasury. 
Thus, according to Toma (pp. 181-82),  the Fed’s acceptance of  the 
Treasury’s gold sterilization policy in  1936 rather than conducting the 
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dominance over monetary policy,  as Friedman and  Schwartz argue 
(p. 532), but rather represented a policy designed to preserve its share 
of inflation tax revenue at the expense of the Treasury. For Toma, gold 
sterilization was a way of preventing the Treasury from continuing to 
capture the capital gain from monetization of gold inflows. 
Evidence for the bureaucratic model is based on an observed positive 
association between the Fed’s expenditures and its open market wealth.” 
A key implication  of this approach is that the Fed  has sufficient in- 
dependence to produce whatever rate of monetary growth is required 
to maximize its profits. This assumes the central bank operates in  a 
vacuum, completely  removed  from the underlying political realities. 
The record indicates, to the contrary, that the Fed’s  overall policy 
stance is clearly related to the desires of the elected government (Wein- 
traub 1978). The scope for the type of independent action suggested 
by Toma is indeed limited. 
1.4.7  The World War I1 Bond-Price-Support  Program 
During World War 11, the Fed followed a bond-price-pegging program 
to assist Treasury bond financing of the war at favorable interest rates. 
Wicker (1969) holds, contrary to Friedman and Schwartz (ch. lo), that 
the Fed did not give up its independence to the Treasury by agreeing 
to  the bond-price-support  program in March 1942. Based on his reading 
of the record, both the Fed and the Treasury were in favor of preventing 
interest rates from rising,  but disagreed  on how  to do it, with  the 
Treasury favoring reductions in reserve requirements to provide excess 
reserves and the Fed favoring open market operations. As a compro- 
mise, the Treasury accepted a Fed plan to peg the short-term interest 
rate at 343  percent. 
Rather than being an “engine of  inflation,”  Toma (1985) construes 
the bond-price-support program as a solution to the time-inconsistency 
problem faced by the wartime monetary authorities, following Barro 
and Gordon (1983). According to the Barro-Gordon hypothesis, as long 
as the public rationally  expects the monetary authorities to produce 
monetary surprises, they will reduce their real cash balances, and hence 
the authorities will capture less seigniorage than long-run revenue max- 
imizing would predict. To solve the problem a preannounced rule is 
needed. The 2Yz  percent ceiling on long-term yields was a rule to allow 
the authorities to rearrange the time path of inflation, to satisfy the 
government’s  intention  to shift  consumption from the future to the 
present, and to assure the public that, while money growth might in- 
crease during the war, it did not represent a long-run policy. For long- 
term interest rates to stay below the pegged level for extended periods 
of time, and long-term expectations to stay low, open market operations 
had to keep the long-run inflation rate low. The support program thus 49  The Contribution of  A Monetary History 
implied that anticipated rapid money growth during the war would be 
followed by a long period of restraint. 
Toma’s arguments in favor of this view are: (1) if the public did not 
believe in the government’s commitment, it would have shifted into 
short-term securities; (2) money growth declined after the war; (3)  real 
cash balances  were abnormally  high  even after price controls were 
lifted, reflecting expectations of postwar disinflation; (4) based on the 
35 percent greater increase in interest rates that occurred during World 
War I, seigniorage collected in World War I1 without the bond-support 
program, because of reduced real cash balances, would have been 3.5 
to 10 percent lower each year.33 
An alternative interpretation to that of Toma’s, which also stresses 
the role of  expectations yet is consistent with that of  Friedman and 
Schwartz, is  that long-term price  expectations  were anchored by  a 
strong belief in a return to the gold standard. The experience of rapid 
deflation after World War I in the United States and in other countries 
committed to a return to the gold standard, would still have been in 
the memories of investors. Moreover, investors would have been aware 
of the negotiations leading to the Bretton Woods Agreement in 1944. 
In addition, Toma fails to mention the wartime unavailability of  con- 
sumer durables and the role of wartime price controls. These were two 
factors which, according to Friedman and Schwartz, raised the level 
of real cash balances (see also Rockoff 1981), in turn generating more 
inflation tax  revenue than otherwise, and at the same time reducing 
inflation expectations. 
1.5  Monetary Standards 
The ninety-four years spanned by A Monetary Hisfory were char- 
acterized by several distinct relationships between the U.S. economy 
and the rest of the world. Friedman and Schwartz devote considerable 
attention to the role of the monetary standard in influencing the rela- 
tionship between monetary and other variables. 
1.5.1  The Greenback Episode, 1862-78 
The greenback period  was a unique episode of  freely floating ex- 
change rates between the United States and the rest of the world. The 
literature stemming from Friedman and Schwartz’s treatment of this 
episode focuses on three themes: the conditions required for resump- 
tion, the role of  news, and Gresham’s Law. 
The Conditions Required for Resumption 
Timberlake (1975) argues, contrary to Friedman and Schwartz, that 
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resumption. His interpretation of the Resumption Act of  1875 is that 
it allowed  the secretary of the Treasury to retire  U.S. notes equal to 
the gross amount of national bank notes issued without accounting for 
voluntary retirement by the commercial banks. Successive secretaries 
of the Treasury took advantage of this provision to reduce high-powered 
money. 
Based on Berry’s  (1978) GNP deflators rather than the wholesale 
price series used by Friedman and Schwartz and by Kindahl (1961),34 
Officer’s (1981) calculation of the real exchange rate between the United 
States and Great Britain in the greenback era suggests that considerably 
less than the 54 percent deflation Friedman and Schwartz calculated 
was required to resume specie payments. In addition, Officer finds that 
the use of Berry’s GNP data corroborates Friedman and Schwartz’s 
conclusion that deflation was a result of rapid real growth and a virtually 
constant money 
The Role of News 
According  to Friedman and  Schwartz, news  affects the exchange 
rate to the extent it affects the demand for and supply of foreign ex- 
change and, at one remove, the determinants of the price level. Some 
studies, however,  have found evidence to support Mitchell’s  (1903) 
emphasis on the importance of news as an exchange rate determinant. 
Roll  (1972), using the capital-asset-pricing  model, demonstrates that 
the Civil War bond markets were efficient in that bond prices quickly 
reflected changes in the premium on gold, as well as all information 
on military events. 
McCandless (1985) tests Mitchell’s (1 903) hypothesis that short-term 
movements of  exchange rates during the Civil War could be explained 
by war news. Based on a time-series model using semi-monthly data 
of the gold prices of the currencies of both the Union and Confederacy, 
he finds that a “news”  variable, consisting of information on battles 
and major political events, systematically affected the exchange rates 
of the belligerents in accordance with Mitchell’s hypothesis. 
For Friedman and  Schwartz, the  money  stock is  an independent 
variable with the price level and exchange rate strongly influenced by 
monetary forces. According to Calomiris (1986), the exchange rate is 
determined primarily by fiscal news-news  about the size of the gov- 
ernment’s budget deficit and the speed of retirement of debt-which 
influences the probability and timing of  resumption.  In turn, the price 
level is anchored by movements in the exchange rate. Given the price 
level  and  the exchange rate, the money  supply passively  adjusts to 
equate real money supply and demand. Vector autoregressions provide 
evidence for this view. They show that innovations  in  the exchange 
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innovations in  several  proxies for fiscal  news precede those for the 
exchange  rate  and  the  price  level.  Unfortunately,  Calomiris,  like 
McCandless, does not  explain  how fiscal  and  war news affects the 
fundamental determinants of the exchange rate. Moreover, Calomiris’ 
model  of  an endogenous money  supply  implies  an unstable money 
multiplier,  an implication  inconsistent  with ample evidence that it is 
stable and predi~table.~~ 
Phelps (1985) compares Friedman and Schwartz’s approach to re- 
sumption to that of the finance approach (Sargent and Wallace 1983). 
According to Phelps, Friedman and Schwartz imply that the behavior 
of the greenback price of gold should vary inversely with expectations 
of future money  growth. In the finance approach (also followed  by 
Calomiris), it should vary inversely with the probability of resumption, 
which in turn depends on announcements of a fiscal policy compatible 
with gold convertibility and an announcement of the date of resump- 
tion. Phelps devises a chronology of thirteen key financial events in 
the greenback era, which he uses to show that the exchange rate re- 
sponded in the direction predicted by events suggesting future changes 
in money growth in only seven cases, whereas it responded to fiscal 
news in all thirteen. 
A major difficulty with the finance approach is that ex ante news is 
virtually  impossible to identify.  The events deemed important from 
today’s perspective may not have been so deemed by market partici- 
pants at the time. 
Gresham’s Law 
Despite Gresham’s Law-which  Rolnick and Weber (1986, 198) de- 
fine as the claim that “when the par price of [two monies] is out of 
line with the market  price,  the money overvalued at the mint drives 
out the undervalued  money,”-the  issue of greenbacks did not drive 
both gold  and silver coins out of circulation.  Instead, though small 
denomination silver coins disappeared, in the eastern part of the coun- 
try gold coins circulated at a premium. The authors explain this paradox 
as follows. If two types of money are coined and made legal tender, 
and the market and legal prices differ, the money which is overvalued 
at the mint becomes the unit of account and the undervalued  money, 
if of large denomination, circulates at a premium, while small denom- 
ination coins are bundled and used as a store of value. The reason is 
that the transactions costs of paying a premium will likely be higher 
for small than for larger denomination currency. 
Furthermore, in  the west, gold  remained  the unit  of account and 
medium of exchange while greenbacks circulated  at a discount, but 
this does not, according  to these authors, contradict the hypothesis 
that the overvalued currency becomes the unit of account. The reason 
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divested greenbacks of legal tender status so they did not have to be 
accepted for payment at par. 
This approach is based on a misinterpretation of  Gresham’s Law. 
Friedman and Schwartz clearly state that Gresham’s Law “applies only 
when there is a fixed rate of exchange”  (fn.  16, p. 27). According to 
them, the simultaneous circulation of gold coins and greenbacks simply 
reflected the operation of a flexible exchange rate. The reason subsid- 
iary silver disappeared was that the market value of silver was bid up 
to the point at which it became useless to facilitate  low value transactions. 
To  sum  up,  Officer,  using  better  data,  confirms  Friedman  and 
Schwartz’s explanation for resumption and its timing. Several articles 
suggest that news may be a more important factor in exchange rate 
determination than Friedman and Schwartz accept, but this literature 
does not explain how news affected the fundamental determinants of 
exchange rates. Finally, Rolnick and Weber view the greenback episode 
as a denial of Gresham’s Law, but their reinterpretation itself does not 
make clear the distinction between fixed and flexible exchange rates 
among types of money. 
1.5.2  The Classical Gold Standard, 1879-1914 
The U.S. restored specie payments on 1 January 1879, and returned 
to the gold standard. According to Friedman and Schwartz, the way 
in which adjustment to both external and internal  disturbances took 
place under the standard was via the classical (Hume) price-specie- 
flow mechanism aided by capital flows. By  contrast, in the monetary 
approach to the balance of payments (MABP) prices and interest rates 
are rigidly linked together through the force of arbitrage in commodities 
and capital markets, and gold flows are the equilibrating mechanism 
by which excess demands (or supplies) of money are cleared (Frenkel 
1971; Johnson  1976; Mundell 1971). 
McCloskey and Zecher (1976) test a model of the monetary approach 
to the balance of payments that assumes arbitrage in world commodity 
and capital markets to explain movements in the U.K. and U.S. balance 
of  payments under the gold standard, 1880-1913.  The authors assess 
the key assumption of commodity arbitrage by examining correlations 
among price  changes between  countries, and among regions  within 
countries under the gold standard. For traded goods such as wheat, 
they found  synchronous correlations equally  high  among regions  as 
among nations, unlike the case of nontraded goods such as labor ser- 
vices  and bricks.  For overall price  indices  they found  a  significant 
correlation between the wholesale price indices of the United Kingdom 
and the  United  States, less so for GNP deflators  and even less for 
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undoubtedly accounts for its higher correlation. Evidence in favor of 
capital market arbitrage was less conclusive.37  They also compare gold 
flows-predicted  by  a simple demand for money function minus the 
money  supply  produced by  domestic credit expansion-with  actual 
gold flows, and found a very close relationship. 
According to McCloskey and Zecher (1984), Friedman and Schwartz 
base their interpretation (p. 99) of the cyclical expansion from 1879 to 
1892  on viewing it  as an excellent example of  the operation of  the 
classical gold standard on annual data. An examination of monthly data 
on gold flows and changes in the price level revealed no tendency for 
price rises to follow gold inflows; instead, price rises preceded gold 
flows, evidence McCloskey and Zecher find to be consistent with ar- 
bitrage and the monetary approach. 
Friedman (1984) in reply argues that the relationship between changes 
in money supplies and price levels is more pertinent than that between 
gold flows and price levels.  Moreover, if  one examines semi-annual 
data, the evidence for that episode suggests that changes in money 
preceded changes in the price level. In addition, when account is taken 
of the proximate determinants of the money stock, it turns out that a 
rise in the money multiplier enabled a rise in the money supply after 
resumption despite no initial gold inflow, and a large gold inflow in 1879 
to be absorbed by a rise in the gold-high-powered money ratio rather 
than in the money supply. Thus for him, the episode still remains an 
example of the classical mechanism in operation.38 
The brief literature cited here on the classical gold standard adjust- 
ment mechanism for the United States could be supplemented by earlier 
articles on both the pre-Civil  War period and the classical period by 
Macesich (1960), Williamson (1961, 1963), and Willett (1968). Pertinent 
recent evidence for other countries includes Jonung (1984) for Sweden, 
Fratianni and Spinelli (1984) for Italy,  Rich (1984) for Canada, and 
Drummond (1976) for Russia. 
The upshot of these studies is that whether the Hume mechanism or 
the monetary approach better explains the operation of  the classical 
gold standard remains unresolved. The evidence is consistent with the 
existence of a number of adjustment mechanisms-commodity price 
arbitrage, interest rate arbitrage, changes in relative prices, gold flows, 
money supply changes, and changes in the underlying structure of the 
international economy-each operating within different time horizons. 
Thus, running a race between  the classical  and monetary approach 
models has only limited value because of the complexity of the issue. 
1.5.3  The Silver Agitation 
Shortly after the  United  States successfully  returned  to the gold 
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agitation for free coinage of silver. The free silver movement achieved 
some of  its aims with  the passage  of the Bland  Allison  Act  of  1878 
which created a silver trading dollar, and the Sherman Silver Purchase 
Act  of  1890 which  instructed the Treasury to purchase 4.5  million 
ounces of  silver  per  month.  According  to Friedman and  Schwartz 
(p. 13  l), the ensuing issue of silver certificates in itself would not have 
increased  the money  supply sufficiently to force the country off the 
gold standard because of the offsetting effects of other sources of change 
in high-powered  money. The real threat to the gold standard created 
by the silver purchases was the adverse expectations created that these 
purchases would lead to even more. The resultant capital outflow led 
to more deflation than would otherwise have occurred. The deflationary 
pressure in turn was an important contributor to the banking panic of 
1893 and  the depression of  the mid-1890s.  Between  1893 and  1896, 
threats to the Treasury’s gold reserves were allayed by direct measures 
it took, including the formation of syndicates of bankers who used their 
credit abroad to engineer offsetting capital inflows. 
Garber and Grilli (1986)  interpret the Belmont-Morgan syndicate of 
1895 as a successful attempt to prevent a speculative  attack on the 
fixed-exchange-rate  gold  standard. Their model  posits  an increased 
probability of attack on the currency according to the extent the rate 
of domestic credit expansion generates an exchange rate in excess of 
parity. From 1890 to 1895,  the United  States ran continuous budget 
deficits financed by domestic credit expansion. Of special importance 
for the deficits were the silver purchases after  1890.  The Belmont- 
Morgan syndicate reduced the money  supply by  selling government 
bonds for gold, and succeeded in reducing the probability of speculative 
attack.3y 
According to Friedman and Schwartz (p. 134),  had a silver standard 
been adopted after 1879,  the United States would have had the benefits 
of  a flexible exchange rate along with  the rest of the gold  standard 
world.  The resultant  fall  in  the monetary demand for gold  and  the 
increase in that for silver would  have  raised  the gold  price of silver 
sufficient to offset the deflation that occurred under the gold standard. 
In support of this contention, Drake (1985)  calculates the hypothet- 
ical behavior of the U.S. price level  between 1879 and 1914 had the 
United States not demonetized silver in 1879. Accounting for biases in 
the market-to-mint ratio due to the hypothetical monetization of silver, 
and for the effects of releasing gold, a reduction in silver for nonmone- 
tary uses, and the effects on other bimetallic countries, he found that 
the  U.S.  WPI  would  have  been more  stable  than  it  was,4o that the 
United  States would  have been on a gold  standard for most  of  the 
period  with the exception of  1879-90, and that the gold-silver  ratio 
would not have strayed for long from the 16:  1 mint ratio. 55  The Contribution of A Monetary History 
1.5.4  The Gold Exchange Standard, 1920-33 
The gold exchange standard reinstated in the 1920s was more fragile 
than its pre-World  War I antecedent as countries substituted holdings 
of foreign exchange for gold, hence reducing the gold reserve base for 
the world  money  supply, and as countries adopted gold  sterilization 
policies, thereby preventing the balance-of-payments adjustment mech- 
anism from working. 
A number of authors provide evidence in support of Friedman and 
Schwartz’s interpretation of the role  of the gold  standard and  U.S. 
policies in transmitting the Great Depression. 
According  to Huffman and Lothian  (1984), unexpected monetary 
shocks that affected real income in one country, were transmitted in 
turn via specie flows (and short-term capital flows) to the money sup- 
plies of other countries, and then to real activity.  The gold standard 
thus served to transmit  the business cycle from country to country. 
Evidence for this view  is based  on Granger-causality  tests over the 
period  1833 to 1933. 
Choudhri and Kochin (1980), in a comparison of the experience of 
a number of  small European countries during the Great Depression 
(1930-33),  find that only Spain, a country which  maintained flexible 
exchange rates with the gold standard world, was successfully insulated 
from the Great Depression. They divide their sample of countries into: 
(a) countries which maintained the fixed-exchange-rate gold standard 
throughout the depression-The  Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, and Po- 
land; (b)  countries which, with the United Kingdom, left gold in 1931- 
Norway, Denmark, and Finland; and (c) Spain. Then, regressing real 
output and the price level for each country on U.S. real output and 
the price level, the results show a strong influence of the U.S. depres- 
sion on the gold standard countries, with Spain completely unaffected 
and the other countries in depression until they cut the link with gold 
in  1931. 
Eichengreen  (1 988) provides evidence that the national gold policies 
of  the  United  States and  France were a  key  cause of  international 
monetary  contraction. Based  on a pooled  cross-section, time-series 
regression  of  the demand for international  reserves for twenty-four 
countries, he shows that U.S. and French gold policies reduced avail- 
able gold reserves to these countries by  one-half.  Furthermore, the 
effects  of  these policies  on the worldwide  demand for reserves far 
outweighed the effects of a shift in liquidity preferences-in  the wake 
of the international financial crisis of 193 I-away  from holding reserves 
in the form of foreign exchange. 
However, Fremling (1985) challenges Friedman and Schwartz’s  view 
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the rest of  the world during the period  1929-31  as evidenced by  an 
increase in gold inflows and the monetary gold stock. According to her, 
gold inflows to the United States and an increase in U.S. gold reserves 
did not necessarily mean that other countries were losing gold. Gold 
mining, as well  as conversions  of  existing  private gold  stocks into 
currency, could have raised total world reserves. 
Fremling presents evidence that from August 1929 to August 1931, 
gold reserves in the rest of the world increased from $6.3 to $6.7 billion 
versus $3.9 to $4.9 billion in the United States. Furthermore, though 
holdings of foreign exchange in the rest of the world declined, this was 
insufficient to offset the increase in gold. Rates of change of the total 
currency stock and gold reserves in the United States compared with 
the rest of the world indicate that the latter also engaged in significant 
sterilization. Thus, to the extent the Great Depression was transmitted 
internationally, other countries as well as the United States must have 
played a significant role.4’  However, Fremling’s analysis considers only 
aggregate behavior, not the one-to-one relations of the U.S. acquiring 
gold and each country losing gold. 
Thus, with the exception of  Fremling’s study, the evidence is over- 
whelmingly in favor of the contention in A Monetary History that the 
Great Depression was spread internationally by  the gold standard. Other 
forces, both real and monetary, however, also played a role.42 
1.5.5  The New Deal Monetary Standard 
The New Deal produced  major changes in  the monetary standard. 
A silver purchase program designed to aid the domestic silver industry 
was instituted at the same time as the gold purchase program. 
According to Friedman and Schwartz, the increase in the price of 
silver led to an appreciation of the Chinese yuan, a decline in exports, 
a rise in imports, a fall in the monetary silver stock, a fall in the money 
stock, and hence falling prices and output. Brandt and Sargent (1987) 
provide new evidence that though prices fell and the monetary silver 
stock declined,  inside money  (private bank  notes and  deposits) in- 
creased, so that the total money supply increased. Also, according to 
them, real output did not fall. They view China as a small open economy 
under the  specie  standard following a real bills policy (Sargent and 
Wallace  1982). As  such, China took  world  prices  as given, and by 
discounting only real bills the private banks ensured convertibility of 
the currency into specie. Banks issued private notes backed by gov- 
ernment securities, themselves backed by future taxes, so the authors 
argue that they can be treated as equivalent to real bills. Because China 
had a vertical Phillips curve, real output did not contract as a result 
of the deflation produced by the U.S.-induced rise in the price of silver. 
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attempting to capture the real resources tied up in a commodity money. 
The reason given for China’s departure from silver and conversion to 
a fiduciary standard in 1935 was that the government wanted to capture 
the social saving from issuing paper money for itself. 
Brandt  and Sargent’s  argument  suffers from  a number of  serious 
shortcomings. First, the timing of the regime change in  1935  is con- 
sistent with Friedman and Schwartz’s explanation that it was purely a 
reaction to the silver purchase policy. Second, a closer examination of 
the evidence presented reveals that real output did decline from 1931 
to 1934. Third, Tamanga (1942) shows that most bank loans were made 
on real estate collateral, a far cry from real bills. It is not certain that 
inside money in fact increased, as Brandt and Sargent contend. Some 
evidence exists that suggests  declining  operations by  native  banks. 
Modern  banks, for which  they  provide  estimates, may  simply  have 
replaced the issues of the native banks that no longer operated. 
1.6  Conclusion: The Legacy of A Monetary History 
A Monetary History ojthe United States has spawned a vast liter- 
ature in economic history, much of which has either corroborated or 
extended themes raised by  Friedman and Schwartz. Their views  on 
the timing of resumption, on the implications of a hypothetical bime- 
tallic  standard for price  stability  in  the last  third  of  the nineteenth 
century, on the defects of the theory underlying the Federal Reserve 
Act, and on the regime change following establishment of the Fed, have 
all been reconfirmed by subsequent researchers applying newer tech- 
niques and more recently available data sources. 
A  number of controversies, however,  still  remain unresolved: the 
role  of  news in the greenback era; whether the Hume price-specie- 
flow-mechanism or the monetary approach better explains balance of 
payments adjustment under the classical gold  standard; whether the 
Fed  really  smoothed the seasonal in  interest rates  and, moreover, 
whether its establishment explains an observed change in the stochastic 
pattern of interest rates around the world; the mechanism of banking 
panics; whether commercial banks in the 1930s faced a liquidity trap 
in excess reserves or a shift in liquidity preferences; whether the Fed 
subordinated itself to the Treasury in the 1930s and 1940s or was acting 
as a revenue-maximizing bureau; and whether the bond-price-support 
program was an engine of inflation or an example of a Barro-Gordon 
rule. 
On one important issue the literature disagrees with  Friedman and 
Schwartz: whether Federal Reserve policy was inconsistent before and 
after 1929. The archival evidence marshalled by Wicker, Brunner, and 
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a strong case for the position that the Fed followed the flawed Burgess- 
Riefler-Strong doctrine throughout the 1920s and early 1930s. The rea- 
son for the Fed’s failure to conduct expansionary monetary policy 
during 1929-31  was that, based on its indicators-the  level of member 
bank reserves and market interest rates-it  believed conditions were 
easy. However, as Wheelock points out, the shift in structure of the 
Fed  after Benjamin Strong’s death likely worsened things, in accord 
with Friedman and Schwartz’s position, as it weakened the influence 
of individuals who had the ability  and understanding  to depart from 
the flawed strategy. 
Finally, a number of episodes have not yet been reassessed by a later 
generation of scholars. One is the post-1951 period, which Friedman 
and Schwartz regarded as a decade of monetary tranquility in a tur- 
bulent era. Why was that period so special? 
The legacy to economic history of A Monetury History is not simply 
that its scholarly and thought-provoking reinterpretation  of U.S. mon- 
etary history has generated a growth industry of scholarly papers. The 
legacy also stems from the novel way in which Friedman and Schwartz 
presented monetary history from the perspective of the relationship 
between the stock of money and the rest of the economy. This inter- 
weave between monetary theory and economic history has changed 
the way monetary  history is approached around the world. The ana- 
lytical framework of the modern quantity theory underlying the book, 
modified and expanded to incorporate newer theoretical and empirical 
techniques, has been applied to the experiences of numerous countries 
over vast ranges of  history. 
Before A Monetary Hisrovy, the study of the development of financial 
and  monetary institutions,  the conduct of  monetary policy,  and the 
anatomy of financial crises, dominated monetary history. A number of 
monetary theorists used  historical  examples to illustrate  particular 
monetary theories, e.g.,  Fisher (191 l), Keynes (1930), and Warburton 
(1958). Some historians applied the quantity theory to explain episodes 
of  inflation,  e.g., Hamilton  (1934) and  White  (1980).  Friedman and 
Schwartz were the first to consistently apply a set of theoretical tools 
to the monetary history of a major country over a period of close to a 
century,  spanning  numerous  institutional  changes  and  monetary 
disturbances. 
In addition, the data on the money stock, its components, and other 
aggregates compiled in A Monetary History and in the two companion 
volumes, has proved  and  will  continue to prove invaluable to both 
historical and applied research in monetary economics. 
By calculating the hypothetical effects on the money stock of a one- 
billion-dollar-open-market  operation at various watersheds during the 
Great Contraction, the authors pioneered the posing of counterfactual 
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Fogel’s (1964) renowned study of the impact of the railroads on U.S. 
economic growth. 
The unique  portrayal of the historical circumstances of  monetary 
disturbances and  of  alternative institutional  arrangements as back- 
ground conditions, serve the monetary economist with the closest thing 
to a laboratory experiment. The book’s example has become an im- 
portant tool of modern macroeconomic research. 
In the dark age of vector autoregressions  where it is no longer possible 
to identify truly causal relationships, turning to the record of history pro- 
vides a beacon of light. A Monetary History has shown the way. 
Notes 
I. However, the reviewers all had critical comments to make. Clower crit- 
icized their methodology for its opaqueness, Tobin was highly critical of their 
treatment of the long-run behavior of velocity and of their explanation of excess 
reserves in the 1930s, Brunner (1965) also criticized the treatment of  excess 
reserves and, along with Meltzer, the lack of an explicit model of the money 
supply process. 
2. See Price (1961). Also see Bordo and Landau (1979) for earlier evidence 
on the pattern of citations in economic theory. 
3. There has been only limited attention paid to the inflation  of 1897-1914. 
See Schwartz (1973) for an excellent summary of worldwide historical evidence 
consistent with the view presented in A Monetary History that sustained rises 
in the price level  are closely associated with money growth in excess of the 
growth of  real output. 
4. In a similar type of  argument, Calomiris and Hubbard (1986) attribute 
economic contraction in the pre-1914 period to credit rationing in the face of 
deflationary shocks. 
5. See Calomiris and Hubbard (1987). 
6. Based  on Granger-causality  tests between the unexpected shock com- 
ponent of failed business liabilities and both a proxy for consumption (pig iron 
production) and a measure of  losses on deposits. 
7. It also should be pointed  out that there were numerous arrangements 
available short of complete restriction. Thus, for example, in the 1930s banks 
would pay out part of a withdrawal and then pay interest on the remainder. 
8. This section draws on Bordo (1986). 
9. Friedman and Schwartz (1963a, 1963b) recognize the possibility of influ- 
ences running from income to money,  but  present  evidence that for major 
contractions the influence from money to income clearly dominates. 
10.  The sample underlying Gordon and Wilcox’s simulations covered only 
a limited number of observations of business cycles, Lothian (1981) notes. In 
regressions based on annual money and income data over the period  1893- 
1928, money explained a substantial proportion of the fall in income until 1930 
and all of the decline in the decade of the 1930s. 
Lothian also compares the experiences of the U.S.  and the U.K.  in  the 
depressions of  1920-21  and  1929-33,  presenting evidence that the cycles in 
both countries had monetary origins and that monetary factors explained their 60  Michael D. Bordo 
severity and duration. For money to be passive,  he adds, some factor other 
than monetary growth must have varied  in  the same way between the two 
countries to explain their different cyclical performances, yet no one had pro- 
duced such evidence. 
Meltzer (1981) denies that the monetary base could have been caused by 
feedback from income because (a) banks rarely borrowed from the Federal 
Reserve, (b) there was little evidence of a strong influence coming through the 
balance of payments, and (c) Fed open market policy did not respond  much 
to movements in income. 
1 I. Trescott (1984) finds that Boughton and Wicker’s demand for currency 
regression is unstable when divided at February-March  1933 and at January 
1924. The first period, according to Trescott (1982). represents a different policy 
regime, the second is dominated by the Bank Holiday. When the pre-1924 and 
post-March  1933 periods are removed, the regression shows bank failures to 
have been the key cause of the rise in the currency-deposit ratio,  1930-33. 
12. Wicker regards the failure of  the Bank of United States in  December 
1930 as localized in  New York  City, contributing little to an increase in  the 
bank failure rate elsewhere in the country. 
The banking panic of 1930, according to Wicker (1982), was unique in that 
it originated outside the New York money market and had no discernible effects 
on  interest rates except in local markets. Its only effect appeared to be a decline 
in expenditure in the St. Louis Federal Reserve District (the district containing 
most of the affected banks) that was induced by a reduction in bank debits. 
13. Also see Gandolfi and Lothian  (1979) and Schwartz (1981). Although 
Boughton and Wicker (1979) find interest rates to be a significant determinant 
of  the deposit-currency  ratio, they are doubtful that the elasticity was large 
enough to justify Temin’s claim. 
14. See  also Schwartz (1981, p. 20) and Meltzer (1976) who argue that Temin’s 
position implausibly implies that if the economy was characterized by an  excess 
supply of money, goods, and labor, by Walras’ Law there would have been an 
excess demand for securities. 
15. See also Temin (1983). 
16. See Bordo and Schwartz (1977, p.  102). 
17. Anderson and Butkiewicz (1980) obtain similar results using quarterly 
data. 
18. Streefkerk (1983) constructs a rational-expectations-based  model of the 
Great Depression in the U.S. which, following the approach of Brunner, Cu- 
kierman, and Meltzer (1980), distinguishes between temporary and permanent 
shocks. His preliminary results are consistent with the Schwartz account. 
19. Hamilton (1987b) reinterprets this episode and the 1931  gold drain as 
examples conducive to analysis by  the speculative attack models developed 
by Garber and Flood (1982) and others. 
20.  Bessler (1985) tests George Warren’s hypothesis (Warren and Pearson 
1935) that leaving the gold standard and allowing the price of gold to rise would 
immediately raise the price of traded goods and hence the price level. Bessler 
finds, based on  innovation accounting  from vector autoregressions  with weekly 
data, that gold prices in  1933 Granger-caused key agricultural commodities 
prices, with a very rapid response. 
21. Cagan (1965) calculates the rate of return on issuing national bank notes 
as the ratio of the net interest income earned on the bonds purchased with the 
issued notes (net of the costs of note redemption, cash reserves on the notes 
at the Treasury, and a small  tax on the note issue) to the amount of capital 61  The Contribution of A Monetury History 
tied up in acquiring the bonds-the  difference between the market price and 
the amount of notes issued. He finds rates of return comparable to those on 
other assets over the period 1875 to 1913, except for the late 1880s. By  1900, 
the rate of return was close to 25 percent. For Cagan, the puzzle is to explain 
why, at such high  rates of  return, less than 60 percent of eligible notes were 
issued. 
22.  Canova (1987),  who uses a  model  of stochastic seasonality  based on 
spectral methods, finds that the interest rate seasonal  was not eliminated in 
1914. He attributes the reduction  in  banking panics after 1914 to the Fed’s 
ability to offset foreign-induced shocks to the money supply. Also see Dewald 
(1972) for evidence against a reduction in the seasonal, and Wheelock (1987) 
who finds no evidence of  any change in interest rate and bank reserves sea- 
sonals after 1929. 
23. Friedman and Schwartz see an inconsistency between the two founding 
principles in that the gold standard effectively limited money issue whereas 
the real  bills doctrine did not. See Mints (1945). Sargent and Wallace (1982) 
construct an overlapping-generations model for a small open economy under 
the gold standard, which they argue is consistent with the real bills doctrine 
of Adam Smith. However, Laidler (1984) sees little relevance of their model 
to Smith’s treatment of the real bills doctrine or the gold standard. 
24.  However, Toma (1987) demonstrates, based on vector autoregressions 
and monthly data, that the Fed could not have conducted countercyclical open 
market operations during the 1920s because such operations were fully offset 
by  changes in  member  bank  borrowing  which  left  Federal  Reserve credit 
constant. 
25. Epstein and Ferguson (1984) disagree that the reason the Fed conducted 
large open market purchases in early 1932 was because of Congressional pres- 
sure. They argue it did so because the rise in the discount rate in  October 
1931, by reducing bond prices, threatened the solvency of many large banks, 
putting pressure on the Fed to act. The reason for early abandonment of the 
program was declining short-term yields which squeezed the earnings of many 
large commercial banks (who had shifted their portfolios from long-term to 
short-term bonds as a reaction to the preceding liquidity crises). According to 
the authors, it  was no accident that Governor MacDougall of Chicago and 
Governor Young of Boston were the chief opponents of open market purchases, 
as these were two key districts whose member banks had the highest ratio of 
investments to loans and the lowest net earnings. 
26. Wicker also disagrees with Friedman and Schwartz’s  view that domestic 
rather than international  considerations dominated policy  in  the  1920s.  His 
interpretation of the evidence is that in  1924 the majority of governors voting 
for expansionary open market policy did so because of a desire to build up the 
security holdings of the Fed to offset a future inflationary gold inflow.  In ad- 
dition, Governor Strong wanted to reduce the interest rate differential between 
London and New York to help Britain return to gold. International consider- 
ations also predominated  in  1927, according to Wicker. By contrast, in  1930, 
the gold standard was not in danger, hence little need was seen for expansionary 
policy. Brunner and Meltzer’s (1968) interpretation of the record disputes Wick- 
er’s emphasis on international factors. Their critique is buttressed  by the in- 
significant influence of several international variables in  Fed policy reaction 
functions that Wheelock estimates (1987). 
27.  Wheelock  uses a longer sample period  than Trescott, and constructs 
separate reaction functions  for each of the Fed’s policy tools, whereas Trescott 62  Michael I). Bordo 
focuses only on the Fed’s open market holdings and conducts formal stability 
tests.  His application of stability tests to Trescott’s model shows no change 
in  policy in  1929. 
28. For a discussion of the influence of the small unit  bank lobby on US. 
banking legislation before 1929, see White (1983). 
29. See Friedman and Schwartz (fn. 22, pp.443-44) for a similar view. See 
also Schwartz (1979). For  evidence that the paying of  interest  on demand 
deposits did not lead banks to engage in riskier investments than otherwise, 
see Benston (1964). 
30. White (1986) effectively argues that investment banking activity by the 
commercial banks during the 1920s did not impair their balance sheets. 
31. There is overwhelming evidence against a liquidity trap in the demand 
for money during the 1930s.  See, e.g.,  Gandolti and Lothian (1976) and the 
studies surveyed in Laidler (1985). Brunner and Meltzer (1968b) provide evi- 
dence against a liquidity trap in bank excess reserves. 
32. Based on a regression using annual data from 1947 to 1979 of changes 
in  real  Federal  Reserve expenditures on the Fed’s open market wealth, a 
measure of the Fed’s nonmonetary output, and a wage variable. 
33. The 1947 agreement between the Fed and Treasury to eliminate the Y8 
percent ceiling on short-term rates was not a reflection of the Fed’s concern 
with inflation, as argued by Friedman and Schwartz, according to  Toma (1982). 
Instead, according to the theory of bureaucracy, it served to eliminate a pro- 
gram which made short-term bonds as good as money. The agreement caused 
banks to increase excess reserves, reduce the deposit-reserve ratio and hence 
the money multiplier, thereby raising the Fed’s share of inflation  tax revenue. 
Further, according to this interpretation, the Fed’s decision  in  1947  to turn 
over a fraction of its open market revenue to the Treasury was in exchange 
for the Treasury’s agreement to eliminate the ceiling on short-term rates. At 
the same time, the transfer served to prevent an attempt by Congress to  capture 
some of the inflation tax revenue earned during World War 11. 
34. According to Officer, the wholesale price series Kindahl, Friedman, and 
Schwartz used is flawed by double counting, the omission of services, and the 
overweighing of imports. 
35. Indeed the annual growth rate of Berry’s real GNP  series of 4.2 percent 
from  1869  to 1879  is almost identical to Friedman  and  Schwartz’s refined 
estimate (1963a, 39, table 3) of 4.3 percent. 
36. See, e.g., Cagan (1965). 
37. Calomiris and Hubbard (1987) provide further evidence of commodity 
and capital market arbitrage.  They calculate allowable bandwidths between 
U.S. and British  prices  of  selected  commodities  consistent with  arbitrage, 
finding the actual price movements fall within the range. Evidence for capital 
market integration is based on triangular arbitrage between U.S. and British 
high-grade commercial paper rates and bills of exchange. 
38. Aghelvi’s (1975) evidence for the U.S. during this period that anticyclical 
movements of  the balance  of trade dominate procyclical movements of net 
capital flows supports the Friedman and Schwartz rather than the monetary 
approach model. 
39. Garber (1986) treats dollar bonds under bimetallism as  an  option allowing 
the holder to receive, on maturity, either gold or silver, depending  on  whichever 
metal’s price had  increased  relative to the official  price.  Calculation of  the 
option value of bonds during the period  1818-96  provides  evidence on the 
probability the market attached at various times to a switch between silver and 
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40. Also see Timberlake (1978a) who makes a similar argument without the 
simulations. 
41. Hamilton (1987a) notes that net gold flows going to the U.S. still supports 
Friedman and Schwartz. Also, it is not clear from Fremling’s argument why 
it should matter if  the sources of gold are private or official. 
42.  See, e.g.,  Meltzer (1976),  Brunner (1981), and Saint-Etienne (1984) on 
the importance of the Smoot-Hawley tariff, Eichengreen (1987a) for the counter 
view. Eichengreen  ( I987b) assesses various  monetary and nonmonetary ex- 
planations,  downplaying  virtually all  except the consequences of  U .S. and 
French contractionary gold policies. 
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A Note on Anna J. Schwartz’s Contribution to 
pre-1867 Monetary History  Hugh Rockoff 
There are many distinguished economists and economic historians who 
would  be  willing to help  honor Anna Schwartz by  commenting  on 
Michael Bordo’s paper. The reason why I am doing so is rather special. 
During her career, Anna Schwartz has not had many formal students 
in  the way that a university professor would because for most of her 
career she has been associated with the National Bureau. But she has 
had  a  number of  unofficial  students whom she has encouraged and 
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counseled, such as Michael Bordo and myself. So I  am commenting 
here as one of Anna’s “students.” 
I have decided not to try to criticize Bordo’s paper in the usual way. 
Bordo has given us an encyclopedic survey of  the current state of 
research on issues explored in A Monetary History. Most of the com- 
ments I would make on particular issues would reflect relatively small 
differences in emphasis. Rather, I have decided to use this opportunity 
to add an appendix to Bordo’s paper by focussing on Anna Schwartz’s 
contribution to pre-1867 monetary history. 
There has  been a tendency,  I  believe, for economic historians to 
concentrate excessively on certain episodes. I have not tried to estimate 
an exact number, but it is clear from Bordo’s survey of the literature 
that  a very  substantial percentage of  the papers he cites, perhaps a 
majority, are about the Great Depression. If our aim is to build a useful 
set of generalizations, it is necessary to move beyond  what is, after 
all, one very atypical episode. Indeed, it simply may not be possible 
to decide among all  the plausible explanations by  solely examining 
events within the Great Depression itself. A Monetary History, of course, 
provides a wealth of  other episodes worthy of further research. But I 
believe that the pre-1867 period, at least until recently, has been rel- 
atively neglected. 
Pre-1867  monetary  history  has  been  a  special  concern  of  Anna 
Schwartz. And  what  I  intend is  to briefly review  some of  her most 
influential papers in this area, as well as the suggestions for research 
they contain that have not yet been taken up by other scholars. These 
papers are well known to specialists. But looking at them en masse 
may help to stimulate additional interest in the pre- 1867 period. 
New Data 
Monetary Statistics of the United States, the second volume of  the 
trilogy, contains, in addition to a discussion of the construction of the 
data for the post-1867 period, a table providing the extant raw materials 
for estimates of  the stock of  money in the United States, or at least 
some components, going back to 1775, and a discussion of the existing 
estimates of the pre-1867 stock of money. Friedman and Schwartz do 
not offer new totals, perhaps indicative of  the basically fragmentary 
nature of the data. But their data could be used for starting points for 
studies  of  a  number of  relatively  neglected  episodes, including the 
Revolutionary War, the War of  1812, and the inflation following the 
discovery of  gold in California. 
At the end of their discussion of the pre-1867 monetary data, Fried- 
man and Schwartz note that there does not seem to be any break be- 
tween the monetary data before and after the Civil War. Some preliminary 
calculations illustrate this point. The ratio of money to GNP seems little 72  Michael D. Bordo 
different in the years after the Civil War from the years immediately be- 
fore, apparently hovering around 15 percent. But if this is so, this is a 
surprising negative finding. The Civil War was an era of rapid change in 
the monetary system-the  national banking system was set up, the gold 
standard was suspended, a large federal debt was created, and slavery 
was abolished. It seems surprising that these changes left little imprint 
on the money-income ratio. The absence of  careful study of this issue 
is an illustration of the point made by Bordo and Schwartz in a survey 
of monetary history published some years ago that there is a relative 
lack of studies of the demand for money given the key role assigned to 
this function by monetary theorists (1977, 118). 
A second major work in the area of data collection for the pre-1867 
period  was Schwartz’s study of  dividend and interest payments by 
U.S.  corporations in the middle of the nineteenth century (1960).’  Here 
Schwartz put together data from a variety of sources, including a Civil 
War  tax on dividend  and  interest  payments, to draw  a  preliminary 
picture of the growth and changes in this component of spending. This 
study shows how much can be learned about profits and profit rates in 
this period if  the archives are attacked with sufficient imagination and 
energy, and, as Schwartz is at pains to emphasize, it shows the path 
toward more detailed estimates. 
But even the numbers she brought to light in this paper are extremely 
interesting.  Much has been written about the effects of Civil War in- 
flation, a major issue being the meaning of what appears to be a well- 
documented fall in real wages. Wesley Claire Mitchell (1903, 380-911, 
in  his  original statement of the problem,  argued that the fall  in  real 
wages  implied  a substantial increase in  real profits.  But  Kessel  and 
Alchian (1959) argued that real wages fell to reflect lower productivity 
and a variety of other real factors. There was, in other words, no real 
profit inflation  to correspond to the real wage deflation. Others have 
since entered the debate. But Schwartz’s numbers provide the best 
direct evidence of what actually happened to profits during the wartime 
inflation,  although her sample, which  I interpret as showing a small 
rise in real dividends. needs to be broadened. 
Historical Studies 
I want to mention four st,udies here that have been influential and 
yet contain important conjectures still to be examined in detail. 
One of Schwartz’s important historical  studies is concerned with a 
topic that has recently drawn considerable attention: the role of com- 
petition in antebellum banking (1947a).2 In that paper Schwartz showed 
how  banks in  Philadelphia,  beginning  with  the lone  Bank  of  North 
America in 1782, accommodated themselves to the growth of compe- 
tition. It is a fascinating tale of rent seeking-to  use a term that became 73  The Contribution of A Monetary History 
fashionable later-and  wildly exaggerated fears. Too much attention in 
the recent literature, I believe,  has been  focussed on so-called  free 
banking.  And much more could be learned about the sort of banking 
system Schwartz describes which is based on legislative charters. 
Richard Sylla (1985) has cited Schwartz in the course of an argument 
that monopoly banking tended to break down and that we had de facto 
free banking in many localities, even under a chartered system, before 
the Civil War. But as I read her paper, banks continued to pay a fee 
for a charter. Implicit is a model in which the legislature weighs the 
increased fees it could charge for charters against some notion of public 
welfare, perhaps with a dose of corruption thrown in for good measure. 
And it is not at all clear in what ways and by how much the Philadelphia 
system differed  in the long run from a  competitive one. Obviously, 
more research into the functioning of the sort of system investigated 
by  Anna Schwartz would  help to balance  our picture of antebellum 
ban king. 
Economic historians  of a  monetarist  bent are fond of pointing to 
the overwhelming range of evidence for the proposition  that money 
matters. It  is  an important, but often forgotten, point.  Criticism of 
the monetarist interpretation of  the Great Depression, for example, 
on the grounds that it is merely consistent with what happened, misses 
the point that the interpretation is based on principles that are con- 
sistent with a wide range of other evidence. Perhaps no single paper 
illustrates  the range of that evidence more than Schwartz’s famous 
paper, “Secular Price Trends in Historical Perspective” (1973). There 
she examined the relationship  between long-term changes in  money 
per  unit  of  output  and  prices,  over two-and-one-half  millennia.  It 
constitutes a  powerful case for the quantity  theory because the re- 
lationship holds over such a wide range of institutional relationships. 
The paper also contains one of those conjectures that one might have 
expected to generate considerable interest. She notes one exception to 
the quantity theory: the sixteenth century currency manipulations, be- 
ginning with Henry the VIII’s debasements and ending with the resto- 
ration of the currency under Elizabeth. Prices did not rise in proportion 
to the stock of money during the debasements and did not fall in pro- 
portion when the currency was called down. But as far as I know, no 
one has risen to the challenge this poses. It may be, as  Schwartz  suggests, 
that the expectation of further debasements (in effect, an expected cap- 
ital gain on currency) increased the demand for money sufficiently to 
offset a good bit of the increase in the nominal supply during the de- 
basements. During the restoration, expectations of a further calling down 
of the currency may have reduced the demand for money. Over  the whole 
period of the debasements and restoration, it should be noted, prices 
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An  important diversion  in  the paper on  secular price trends con- 
cerned the role of cost-push explanations of inflation. This theme was 
taken up again in two papers written with Michael Bordo (1980, 1981). 
In these papers, Bordo and Schwartz examine the argument put for- 
ward by W.  W. Rostow and W.  A. Lewis that nineteenth century secular 
price movements could be attributed to changes in relative prices of 
major agricultural commodities rather than to monetary forces. They 
examine both  the logic of  the Rostow-Lewis argument and the evi- 
dence. Although their regressions showed some impact from a terms- 
of-trade variable on the price level, the dominant variable was the stock 
of money. 
These papers, like the others 1 have noted, contain important con- 
jectures for future research.  Bordo and Schwartz note, for example, 
that for some purposes the monetary constitution itself may be regarded 
as an endogenous variable (1981,118- 19). Why was there such pressure 
to convert the world to the gold standard in the late nineteenth century? 
Was it related to changes in the demand for money that increased the 
welfare gain from a lower equilibrium rate of  price change? No one, 
alas, has followed up on that suggestion. 
Finally, let me mention one last paper that I have found extremely 
useful. This paper, “Real and Pseudo-Financial Crises” (Schwartz 1986), 
provides  a helpful way of  classifying financial disturbances. Real fi- 
nancial crises for Schwartz are those in which the payments mechanism 
is in danger. Other disturbances, even though painful asset price ad- 
justment may be involved, are only pseudo-crises. Real crises alone, 
she argues, require central banks to act in the role of  lender of  last 
resort. Most of the paper uses this distinction to compare and contrast 
a number of financial crises, and to explore some current theories of 
crises. One implication, for me, is that the comparative study of crises, 
despite the long history of this line of research, is still likely to prove 
fruitful. 
Conclusion 
The  pre-1867  period  remains  a  fertile  area  for  research.  Anna 
Schwartz’s papers are a good starting point for anyone entering this 
area. They show how a determined and imaginative use of the archives 
can pull out a surprising amount of  data, and they provide a rich set 
of conjectures for future research. 
Notes 
1.  In  addition to the two pieces  cited  in  the text, two others should be 
mentioned. The monumental study with A. D. Gayer and W.  W. Kostow ([I9521 75  The Contribution of A Monetary History 
1975) produced a wide range of series describing the industrial revolution in 
Britain that have since become the mainstays of historical  research. An ap- 
pendix  to the first volume  of  the U.S.  Gold  Commission  Report  (1982).  a 
commission for which Anna Schwartz served as staff director, brings together 
an important set of data on gold production. 
2.  In another paper published in the same year, Schwartz (1947b) provided 
a detailed critique of  Fritz Redlich’s famous study of the origins of American 
commercial banking. 
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General Discussion 
STEIN  asked Friedman and Schwartz what substantive changes in em- 
phasis and presentation they would  make to A  Monetary History in 
view of the criticisms raised in the past twenty-five years. 
M. FRIEDMAN  replied  that children and books should be treated in 
the same way-you  raise them and they have to live their own life. He 
(and Schwartz) expressed no interest whatsoever in redoing the book. 
Friedman then discussed the criticisms of A Monetary History sur- 
veyed by Bordo. He made the point that Temin’s attack on the monetary 
interpretation  of the Great Depression was directed at the wrong target. 
The primary  emphasis in A  Monetary History was on the  1931-33 
period, whereas Temin focussed on 1929-31.  He was willing to accept 
the other substantive criticisms of the book or to believe that they have 
been amply demonstrated by others not to be valid. 
Finally, Friedman reiterated the emphasis placed in A Monetary His- 
fory on the two-way relationship between money and income. He felt 
that a major misinterpretation of that conclusion was the view that if 
income influences money, you do not have to worry about the further 
influence of money. He criticized much of current economic analysis 
for overemphasizing the distinction between exogenous and endoge- 
nous variables. The key question is the level of analysis engaged in. 
At a deep enough level, everything is endogenous. At a shallow level, 
everything is exogenous. 
KOCHIN  amplified Friedman’s comment on the relationship between 
money and income. For Kochin, the key aim of  A Monetary History 
was to find if the relationship of money to income was pretty much the 
same regardless  of institutional regime, or of movements within  the 
institutional  regime.  Indeed the overwhelming  bulk  of  the NBER’s 
money  and business cycles project  was devoted to three questions: 
does income influence money‘?; if so, by how much?; and is the influ- 
ence of money on income independent of the influence that exists from 
income to money.  Kochin expressed amazement that the criticism of 
A Monetary History ignored the possible influence of income on money. 
MARTY  asked Friedman and Schwartz whether it would have made 
a difference if  the one-third decline in the money stock during 1929- 
33 had been inside rather than outside money. 
M. FRIEDMAN  pointed  out that it was inside money  that declined, 
and that outside money, i.e., high-powered money, rose in that period. 
He then described a research project he had worked on at the Federal 
Reserve Bank of  San Francisco over a decade ago in  which  he at- 
tempted to test the proposition raised by Marty’s question-that  only 
outside money and not inside money ought to matter. If outside money 77  The Contribution of A  Monetary History 
should count, then high-powered money not adjusted for changes in 
reserve requirements should be more closely related to other variables 
than high-powered money adjusted for reserve requirements, because 
the adjustment for reserve requirements makes the resulting series a 
proxy for inside plus outside money. His results indicated the oppo- 
site-the  inside money proxy  was consistently and  significantly  su- 
perior to the outside money proxy. These findings, he felt, were puzzling 
because from a purely theoretical point of view what should matter is 
only that part of money on which holders earn zero interest. 
POOLE  argued that focus on outside rather than inside money seems 
equivalent to saying that financial intermediaries really do not do  any- 
thing, whereas in fact they are able to successfully turn illiquid, non- 
marketable loans  into demand deposits.  He suggested  that greater 
emphasis should be placed on a theory of intermediation. 
M. FRIEDMAN  amplified the argument leading him to emphasize high- 
powered money. It is that a perfect capital market implies a high degree 
of substitutability among interest-bearing assets. A deposit is a mixture 
of a non-interest-bearing asset and an interest-bearing asset. Only the 
non-interest-bearing  asset is pure money. In a perfect capital market 
the interest-bearing asset would be a perfect substitute for others. Poole’s 
point is that intermediaries exist because the capital market is highly 
imperfect.  From that point of view, the appropriate definition of the 
monetary aggregate would  be  a weighted  average of  different asset 
types, where the weights are the fraction of each asset type that can 
be considered money as opposed to an asset. This was the type of 
measure favored by Friedman and Schwartz in Monetary Statistics. 
CAGAN  described recent Federal Reserve research on Divisia Indices 
to produce such an aggregate. 
LAIDLER  suggested that this discussion leads to the conclusion that 
it really matters that money is a medium of exchange. 
M. FRIEDMAN  agreed that it does matter that money is a medium of 
exchange. However, he had reservations about interpreting the medium- 
of-exchange function very narrowly. He emphasized that it also matters 
that money is an asset. Thus, he would treat money notjust as amedium 
of exchange but as a capacity to discharge  debts without creating a 
corresponding liability. 
BRUNNER  pointed out that outside money and high-powered  money 
(the monetary base) were not equivalent. The analytic function of  the 
concept is very different. The division into outside and inside money 
emerged with the specification of the Pigou effect. Outside money is a 
necessary, but marginal, component of the real wealth effect. The term 
has on many occasions, however, served a less useful function in money 
supply theory, particularly  when large portions of the monetary base 
consist of  inside money, as was the case during the early  1920s. 78  Michael D. Bordo 
He also pointed  out that when  we  discuss interest payments on 
various forms of money we  should remember that the total  yield of 
money is the sum of its marginal productivity plus the interest payment. 
He argued that whether interest is or is not paid on money makes little 
difference for explanations of money stock and bank credit and for the 
quality of monetary control, but it may make a difference in  terms of 
efficiency.  It was  not  immediately  clear to him  whether this result 
depends on the regulatory system. 
MARTY  clarified the question he raised at the conference. He was 
trying to get Friedman and Schwartz to comment on the position re- 
cently  taken by  Bernanke that the failure of  the banks as financial 
intermediaries  prolonged  the depression of  the  1930s  in  the  United 
States, and that this failure of the intermediary function produced an 
effect over and above the reduction in the stock of money. 
Marty agreed with Brunner and Meltzer’s evaluation of the specific 
historical  episode of  the  1930s. Following  Friedman  and Schwartz, 
Brunner and Meltzer argued that an increase in high-powered  money 
sufficient to offset the reduction in the money multiplier would have, 
in the main, eliminated the credit shock. However, Marty took issue 
with the generalizations made by them in their Mattiolli lectures, that 
in every case no independent shock to credit exists-rather,  all such 
shocks were due to monetary causes.  Postulating  a  totally  outside 
money world, Marty constructed an example of an independent shock 
to credit that widened risk premiums and reduced (nonbank) financial 
intermediation. 
M. FRIEDMAN,  in a comment on Rockoff’s paper, cited another case 
of an inflation  that cannot be  attributed to a  monetary source-the 
Korean War inflation. It was the only inflation of substantial magnitude 
in  the United  States or anywhere else that was  not  preceded by  a 
substantial increase in the quantity of money; it was purely a velocity 
inflation. 
HETZEL  asked Friedman and Schwartz if  they had any further in- 
sights into the breakdown of a change in money into a change in real 
output and a change in the price level. 
M. FRIEDMAN  replied that they had not come up with a simple way 
of handling the issue. 
ROSTOW  described how  in  the Gayer-Rostow-Schwartz study the 
proportion of changes in money that supported increases in output and 
prices varied with the stage of the NBER reference-cycle chronology, 
in  turn  depending  on the degree  of  capacity  utilization  in  different 
sectors. 
M. FRIEDMAN  doubted the Keynesian emphasis on excess capacity. 
He stressed the role  of price expectations in  explaining the decom- 
position. However, he admitted how little progress had been made in 
resolving the issue. 